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I. INTRODUCTION
Post-secondary educational institutions are obliged under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act' and Titles 112 and 1113 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (A.D.A.) to refrain from discriminating against
disabled students and program applicants. This duty goes beyond a
simple requirement of equal treatment. The law insists that the
disabled be given an equal opportunity to participate in educational
programs. 4 To achieve the goal of equal opportunity, academic insti-
tutions are required to make reasonable accommodations in their pro-
grams and practices and are specifically required by federal
regulations to make "academic adjustments" to accommodate disabled
students.5 In effect, they may be required to change their standards
for selecting, teaching, and evaluating students. The prohibition
against disability related discrimination is not absolute, however. Un-
like Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids all discrimi-
1. 29 U.S.CA. § 794 (1985 & West Supp. 1995).
2. 42 U.S.C.A._ §§ 12131-12165 (West Supp. 1995).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189 (West Supp. 1995).
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8)(1995)(goal of equal opportunity); id. § 12182
(a) (full and equal enjoyment of goods and services); id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)(equal
opportunity to participate in benefits); 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1995)(Section 504 reg-
ulation); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(ii)(1995)(Title II regulation); id. § 36.201(a),
36.202(b)(1995)(Title III regulations).
5. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (1995).
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nation on the basis of race,6 Section 504 and the A.D.A. protect only
disabled individuals who are "otherwise qualified" to participate in
post-secondary programs.7 Schools are thus allowed to take disability
into consideration and are not required to make modifications that
lower academic standards or cause fundamental changes in the na-
ture of their programs.8 To that extent, both federal statutes attempt
to protect academic decision making in areas that affect the integrity
of educational programs.
"Academic standards" for students is a vast concept and difficult to
reduce to a short, handy definition. Justice Frankfurter once stated
that universities have an institutional right, among other things, to
decide for themselves on academic grounds who should be admitted to
study, what will be taught, and how it will be taught.9 This statement
nicely sets out the realm in which academic standards come into play.
Standards are normally set by the faculty or other academic authori-
ties based on professional judgment although they are often influ-
enced, and sometimes dictated, by accrediting bodies and licensing
agencies. Standards provide a way of assuring that a particular stu-
dent has demonstrated sufficient knowledge, skill, or understanding
to justify admission to a program, retention, or the award of a degree,
certificate, or other evidence of achievement. More specifically, stan-
dards include minimum admissions criteria such as prior grades or
standardized test scores, course requirements, minimum grade point
averages in a program, or other performance criteria. I use the term
"program modification" to refer to alterations in such standards.
It is hardly surprising when students (disabled or otherwise) and
post-secondary institutions disagree over academic programing deci-
sions. The two groups have different interests and perspectives. Stu-
dents are aware that educational achievement is necessary for success
in other stages of life and have every reason to enter and graduate
from post-secondary institutions. Higher education institutions share
the goal of promoting educational achievement by students. However,
these institutions also have an independent interest in maintaining
the integrity of their programs by ensuring that students meet mini-
mum standards of competency for admission and continuation. Cer-
tain accommodations imposed by federal disability laws, such as the
6. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C-A. § 2000d (1995).
7. See infra notes 33-140 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in result)(quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12)(statement of
scholars from the University of Cape Town and Witwatersrand); see generally
infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
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removal of architectural barriers, are hardly academic in any sense.
Objections to these measures are normally based on-expense.lO Other
modifications, however, such as waiver of admissions requirements or
changes in curriculum, strike at the heart of academic decision
making.
Litigation challenging an institution's refusal to make a program
modification often turns on the issue of whether plaintiff was "other-
wise qualified" to participate or continue in the program. Success de-
pends on plaintiff's ability to convince a court that a proposed
accommodation does not affect the integrity of an academic program.
Plaintiffs rarely prevail on these claims, yet judicial decisions favoring
defendants may never reach the merits of an institution's argument
that an accommodation jeopardizes academic integrity. Most courts
refuse to entertain a plaintiff's arguments out of deference to aca-
demic decision making. Deference to academic authorities, however,
has not followed a single pattern. In the absence of a Supreme Court
ruling on the role of deference to academic decisions under the Reha-
bilitation Act and the A.D.A., a variety of approaches have emerged in
the lower courts.
I take the position that judicial deference to academic standards in
Section 504 and A.D.A. claims is a good policy in spite of its tendency
to interfere with the statutory goals of creating equal opportunity for
the disabled. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of judi-
cial deference to academic decisions in Section 504 and A.D.A. actions
involving claims that a student is "otherwise qualified" to participate
in a program. The plan of this paper is as follows. I initially present
in Part II of this Article an overview of Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act and Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
with particular emphasis on their effects on higher education and on
judicial interpretations of the "otherwise qualified" standard. In the
next section, I review the constitutional and common law principles
that courts have relied on in granting deference to academic decisions.
Part IV describes the approaches employed by the lower courts in giv-
ing deference to academic authorities when program modification
claims arise under the Rehabilitation Act and the A.D.A.11 Finally, in
10. Post-secondary institutions are required to conduct their activities in accessible
locations and facilities. Both the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act obligate covered entities to remove physical barriers or provide serv-
ices in accessible locations, subject to exceptions for undue expense. See generally
LAuRA F. RoTHSrEn, DisAamrrms AND THE LAw 273-93 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing
architectural barriers). Program accessibility in this sense lies outside the scope
of this paper.
11. Enforcement of federal disability laws by administrative agencies lies outside the
scope of this paper. Persons claiming discrimination under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act have the option of complaining to the funding federal agency
or the Department of Justice. The agency involved is required to make a prompt
[Vol. 75:27
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Part V, I argue that deference to academic decisions is justified by the
incompetence of courts to review academic standards.
II. ACADEMIC STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 504
AND THE AD.A.
A. Introduction
Both Section 504 and the A.D.A. require post-secondary institu-
tions to change academic standards under certain circumstances. As
a very general rule, schools must make program modifications when a
student or applicant is capable of succeeding in the program with the
aid of an accommodation that does not work a fundamental program
alteration. Such a general formulation obviously leads to a high de-
gree of uncertainty about an institution's obligation in particular in-
stances. Some vagueness in the law was inevitable. Congress chose a
comprehensive strategy for each statute, employing broad terms to de-
fine both the class of persons protected and the extent of protection.
In legislative drafting, breadth and vagueness are often companions.
Normally, the key issue in a Section 504 or A.D.A. claim involving
program modifications is whether the plaintiff is an "otherwise quali-
fied individual." The term originated in Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act where it was not defined. Consequently, the courts were
forced to fashion a definition. The judicial definition, in turn, was in-
corporated into the Americans with Disabilities Act. This section ex-
amines the "otherwise qualified individual" standard in detail. As a
preliminary matter, I have included a summary of the elements of
Section 504 and A.D.A. claims in order to set a proper context for the
"otherwise qualified" concept. I also chose to examine the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the A.D.A. separately. Given the high degree of consis-
tency between the Acts,12 at least as they regard program
modifications, it is possible to regard the "otherwise qualified" stan-
dard as a single concept with two statutory manifestations. The ma-
jority of relevant cases, however, originated under the Rehabilitation
Act. Moreover, it is simply more convenient to deal with the two Acts
separately.
investigation and to attempt informal resolution if a violation is apparent. 28
C.F.R. § 42.107(d)(1)(1995). A formal hearing and decision may follow if informal
means fail. Id. §§ 42.109-42.111. The complainant is not, however, a party to the
enforcement proceedings and is not personally entitled to a remedy for a viola-
tion. See generally RoTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 3.07. The most likely remedy for
a violation in an administrative action is the termination of federal funds. Id.
Agency enforcement has been dismissed by some as ineffective. See, e.g., Bonnie
P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act after Ten Years of Enforcement:
The Past and the Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 845, 851-83 (asserting that the
dissemination of responsibility inhibits effective enforcement).
12. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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B. Section 504
1. Introduction
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first general federal civil
rights act for the disabled. For higher education, the key provision is
Section 504 which prohibits discrimination against the disabled by re-
cipients of federal financial assistance. Application of Section 504 to
post-secondary institutions is nearly universal since most institutions
receive some form of federal financial assistance.1s Section 504 pro-
vides, in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 14
Section 504 is part of a broader scheme of anti-discrimination pro-
visions and mechanisms in Title V of the Rehabilitation Act. Section
50115 requires federal agencies to practice affirmative action in hiring
the disabled. Section 503 requires that federal contracts in excess of
$10,000 contain a similar affirmative action provision.16 Section 502
created the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board.17 The Access Board, as it is commonly known, has a number of
functions including development of standards and guidelines for
building accessability and transportation systems.18 Finally, Title V
contains enforcement provisions.19
2. Elements of a Section 504 Claim
Lower courts have consistently held that the elements of a Section
504 claim are: 1) plaintiff is a disabled individual as defined by the
Act; 2) he or she is otherwise qualified to participate in a program or
activity; 3) he or she has been excluded from participation solely be-
cause of a disability; and, 4) the program receives federal financial
13. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
14. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1985 & West Supp. 1995)).
15. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501, 87 Stat. 355, 390 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (1985 & West Supp. 1995)). Recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance, in contrast, do not have an affirmative action require-
ment. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
16. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 503, 87 Stat. 355, 393 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 793(a)(1985 & West Supp. 1995)).
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 502, 87 Stat. 355, 391 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 792 (1985 & West Supp. 1995)).
18. Id. § 502(b).
19. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 505, as added by Pub. L. No. 95-
602, § 120, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a (1985
& West Supp. 1995)).
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assistance.20 Comprehensive treatment of all elements of Section 504
is, of course, far beyond the scope of this paper.21 The otherwise quali-
fied and discrimination elements are discussed at length in Parts
H.B.3 and 1.C.2-3. However, some commentary about the disability
and federal recipient status elements should be helpful in understand-
ing the role of academic discretion with Section 504 claims.
a. Disability Status
Section 504 protects anyone who is disabled. As a result, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he or she meets the Act's definition of a dis-
abled individual. Disabled individuals are defined under the Act as
"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment."22 Although this paper does not consider the defini-
tion of disability under the Rehabilitation Act in detail, it is important
to note that Congress took a broad view of what constitutes a disabil-
ity. Rather than attempt to generate a list of specific diseases, condi-
tions, and ailments, Congress employed a functional definition which
tests the severity of a claimed disability against its effect on life
activities.23
20. See, e.g., Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir.
1988); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v.
Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981); Doe v. Washing-
ton Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
21. See generally ROTHSTEmN, supra note 10, at 31-45; BoNNiE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A.
GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS wrr DIsASILrriEs: AN ANALYSIS OF FED-
ERAL LAw 3:3 to -3:30 (1994).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(1994).
23. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 1.03.
Regulations implementing the statutory definition add some specificity. The
Department of Education, for example, defines physical and mental impairments
as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neu-
rological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine, or (B) any mental or psycho-
logical disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(1995). The inclusion of "specific learning disabilities" is
obviously significant to post-secondary institutions. Major life activities are de-
fined as: "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." Id.
§ 104.4(j)(2)(ii)(1995) (emphasis added).
Commentary by the Department of Education to its § 504 regulations under-
scores the flexible and inclusive strategy behind the statutory and regulatory def-
inition. The Department states that it elected not to attempt a list of specific
diseases and conditions that met the statutory definition because of "the difficulty
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The lesson of this definition for post-secondary institutions is that
the class of disabled students, and therefore the class of potential liti-
gants, is quite broad. Learning is specifically listed as a major life
activity under the Department of Education (D.O.E.) regulations
while other specified functions such as seeing, hearing, and speaking
have an obvious impact on the learning process. 24 Similarly, D.O.E.'s
commentary to its regulations indicates that the definition of impair-
ment embraces a wide range of conditions that can affect learning
such as "orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and... drug
addiction and alcoholism."25 Studies of college students indicate that
approximately 10% report some type of disability.26 Although the
methodology employed is questionable,27 the studies tend to confirm
the presence of a large group of disabled students enrolled in Ameri-
can post-secondary institutions.
Issues of disability status, however, have little relevance to aca-
demic judgments. Having a disability satisfies one element of a Sec-
tion 504 claim but does not, by itself, require a program modification.
This element of a Section 504 claim amounts to a strictly factual in-
quiry regarding whether a plaintiff has an impairment that interferes
with a major life activity. There is nothing "academic" about this in-
quiry. For example, a college's history department has no particular
wisdom about the severity of a student's arthritis or degree of visual
acuity. As noted below,28 academic judgment is relevant only to the
question of the disabled student's ability to meet standards. Hence,
of ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such list." 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A at
372 (1995). The statement added:
Although many of the comments on the regulations when first proposed
suggested that the definition was unreasonably broad, the Department
found that a broad definition, one not limited to so-called "traditional
handicaps," is inherent in the statutory definition.
Id.
24. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(J)(2)(ii)(1995).
25. 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A at 372 (1995).
26. See Profile of Handicapped Students in Postsecondary Education (1987) (DOE
Doc. No. 065-000-00375-9)(10% of students have disabilities); CATHY HENDER-
SON, HEALTH RESOURCE CENTER OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, COI-
LEGE FRESHMEN wITH DISABILITIES: A STATISTICAL PROFILE (1992) (8.8% of
students have disabilities); see generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 7.01.
27. Studies relying on student self reporting of disabilities are problematic. For ex-
ample, students who wear glasses may over report visual impairments while stu-
dents with AIDS may be reluctant to identify themselves, fearing loss of
confidentiality. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 7.01 n.1. Collecting accurate in-
formation may also be hampered by restrictions on pre-admission inquiries about
disabilities. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(4) (1995).
28. See infra note 33-140 and accompanying text.
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the issue of academic deference should not arise under this element of
a Section 504 claim.
b. Federal Recipient Status
The limitation of Section 504's coverage to recipients of federal fi-
nancial assistance has no appreciable academic implications. Nearly
all post-secondary institutions receive federal money such as student
loan funds; hence they are covered entities under the Act.2 9 Prior to
1987, Section 504 was construed as program specific. In Grove City
College v. Bell,30 the Supreme Court held that the gender discrimina-
tion prohibitions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ap-
plied only to a program receiving funds and not an entire educational
institution. This holding was later extended to Section 504.31 The
program specific holding changed with the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987.32 The 1987 Act subjects an entire institution to Section
504's non-discrimination mandate if any program or sub-division re-
ceives federal funding. Like disability status, receipt of federal money
is a strictly factual issue which few defendants challenge.
3. The Otherwise Qualified Individual Standard
Finally, a plaintiff must establish that he or she is otherwise quali-
fied to participate in a program and was excluded solely on account of
a disability. Although the two are stated as separate elements, in
practice they are difficult to delineate. Justice Marshall's opinion in
Alexander v. Choate33 points out that the two inquiries are "two sides
of the same coin,"34 the ultimate question being to what extent a fed-
eral recipient is required to make modifications in its program or prac-
tices to avoid discriminatory conduct.35 In the typical case, the two
elements merge into an argument that the plaintiff would be other-
wise qualified but for the defendant's discriminatory refusal to make a
reasonable accommodation by modifying its academic program. Since
decisions about student qualifications are thoroughly academic judg-
ments, and since courts are likely to give deference to academic deci-
sions,3 6 it is critical to understand Section 504's otherwise qualified
standard and an institution's obligation to make reasonable accommo-
dations for disabled students. In the context of higher education, judi-
29. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
30. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
31. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). See generally RoTH-
STEIN, supra note 10, § 3.06; TucIER & GoL=STEwI, supra note 21, at 3:34 to -3:37.
32. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
33. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
34. Id. at 300 n.19.
35. Id. at 287.
36. See infra notes 220-67 and accompanying text.
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cial interpretations of the interrelated "otherwise qualified" and
discrimination elements can be reduced to the following statement: a
disabled person is protected under Section 504 if he or she meets an
institution's requirements for participation in an academic program
either with or without a reasonable program modification;3 7 a modifi-
cation is reasonable if it does not involve undue financial or adminis-
trative burdens or require a fundamental alteration in the nature of
the academic program.38
The evolution of this standard is a curious thing. Section 504 ex-
pressly limits protection to "otherwise qualified individuals," but does
nothing to define the term, nor does the Act mention reasonable ac-
commodations. Vagueness in the statutory language is matched by a
lack of guidance in the legislative history.39 It appears that the Con-
gress that enacted the Rehabilitation Act4O viewed Section 504 as a
civil rights statute that would be construed liberally to protect the dis-
abled against discrimination by recipients of federal funds.4 ' The
37. Cf TUcKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 5:1.
38. Id. at 5:4 to -5:10.
39. Susan E. King, Note, Disparate Impact and Meaningful Access Under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, 16 CONN. L. Rav. 609, 610 (1984)(discussing legislative
history of Section 504).
40. The anti-discrimination provisions of Section 504 originated in unsuccessful pro-
posals by Senators Humphrey and Percy, see S. 3044, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 118
CONG. IEc. 525-26 (1972), and Representative Vanik, see H.R. 14033, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 9712 (1972); H.R. 12154, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 117
CONG. REC. 45945 (1971)(to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
include the handicapped as a protected class). The same provisions were also
included in an earlier version of the Rehabilitation Act that was vetoed by Presi-
dent Nixon for reasons unrelated to Section 504. See H.R. 8395, 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1972); S.7, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally Donald J. Olenick,
Comment, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 after
Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 171, 172-76 (1980)(deliberate repetition of the
language of the Civil Rights Act in § 504 demonstrates Congress' commitment to
the disabled.). Senator Humphrey, see 118 CONG. REc. 32,310 (1972), Senator
Percy, see 119 CONG. REc. 6497 (1973), and Representative Vanik, see 119 CONG.
Eec. 18, 137, each stated that Section 504 carried over the intent of their prior
bills. In view of the lack of debate over Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by
Congress, the Supreme Court gives great weight to the statements of sponsors in
inferring the legislative intent behind Section 504. See Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287,296 n.13 (1985). The Court also relied on interpretations of Section 504
in the nearly contemporaneous 1974 Rehabilitation Act Amendments, Pub. L. No.
93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293
n.7, 304 n.24, 306 n.27 (1985); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,
634 n.15 (1984).
41. See Timothy M. Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the De-
fense of Undue Burdens Under Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 LoY. LA. L. Rev.
1471, 1472-81 (1987)(Congress was mindful of protecting not only the mildest
handicapped individuals but the most severely handicapped as well); Brigid Hur-
ley, Note, Accommodating Learning Disabled Students in Higher Education:
Schools' Legal Obligations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 32 B.C. L.
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guiding principle was equal opportunity for the disabled and their in-
tegration into American society.42 Nonetheless, the legislative history
gives no clue about the Congressional view of an "otherwise qualified"
person.43 Apparently, Congress was content to allow federal agencies
to work out the complex details of the Act.44
Regulations implementing Section 504 attempt to spell out a recip-
ient's obligations under the Act. Although many federal agencies have
promulgated rules to implement Section 504,45 those issued by the
Department of Education in Title 34, Part 104 of the Code of Federal
Regulations deal specifically with higher education. Consequently,
these regulations are the most relevant to academic decisions.46 The
Department's rules define a "qualified handicapped person"47 for pur-
Rv. 1051, 1054-55 (1991)(noting the broad social policy underlying technical
changes to Section 504).
42. See, e.g., Sen. Rep. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 70, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2076, 2123; Sen. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong, 2d Sess. 37-41, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.N. 6373, 6388-91; Sen. Rep. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978);
118 CONG. REc. 9495 (1972)(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 118 CONG. REc. 3320
(1972)(Sen. Williams); 118 CoNG. REc. 32,310 (1972) (Sen. Cranston); 119 CONG.
REc. 24,587 (1973) (Sen. Taft); 119 CONG. IEc. 24,586 (1973)(Sen. Cranston); 119
CONG. REc. 24,587 (1973)(Sen. Williams). See generally Olenick, supra note 40,
at 172-76.
43. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 n.13 (1985)(noting lack of Congres-
sional debate on Section 504).
44. Hurley, supra note 41, at 1054-55 (citing S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
120, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6391).
45. At least 55 federal agencies have issued rules under Section 504. TUcKER &
GomSTIN, supra note 21, at 3:2. For a comprehensive list of agency regulations
under Section 504, see id. at B:1-3.
46. To avoid inconsistent regulations, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare in 1978 was directed to coordinate enforcement efforts for all federal agencies
and to prepare guidelines for all agency rules under Section 504. See Exec. Order
No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (Apr. 28, 1976). The Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (H.E.W.) issued guidelines two years later. See 43 Fed. Reg.
2132 (Jan. 13, 1978). In 1980, when H.E.W. was split into the Departments of
Heath and Human Services and of Education, the responsibility for coordinating
enforcement was transferred to the Justice Department. Exec. Order No. 12,250,
46 Fed. Reg. 40,686-87 (Aug. 11, 1981). Section 504 coordination guidelines were
transferred to 28 C.F.R., pt. 41. The Department of Education issued its Section
504 rules in 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 30,936 (May 9, 1980). See generally Roth-
stein, supra note 10, at § 3.07, n.35.
47. Until the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the term "handi-
capped" was generally employed by Congress to refer to those with physical or
mental impairments. RoTHsTEIN, supra note 10, § 1.03. "Handicaped" was uti-
lized in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act until 1992, when it was changed to
"disabled." See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
569, § 102(f), 106 Stat. 4344,4348-49 (1992)(definition of "individual with disabil-
ities."). In titling the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress deferred to the
sensibilities of persons with disabilities and adopted their preferred terminology.
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 50-51; however, no substantive
change in meaning from "handicapped" was intended. Id. Current D.O.E regula-
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poses of post-secondary education as one who "meets the academic and
technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the re-
cipient's education program or activity."48 The Department then sets
out a number of specific rules to implement the Act regarding admis-
sions practices, 49 the general treatment of students,5O housing,51 fi-
nancial and employment assistance52 and non-academic services (e.g.,
physical education and athletics,53 counseling and placement serv-
ices, 54 and social organizations55). For the most part, these regula-
tions do not affect academic practices as defined by this paper.
tions continue to use the term "handicapped." See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)
(1995) (definition of "qualified handicapped person.").
48. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3) (1995). Departmental commentary to the regulations in-
dicates that the term technical standards "refers to all nonacademic admissions
criteria that are essential to participation in the program in question." Id. at
App. A, 374.
49. Id. § 104.42. Recipients may not utilize any admissions test or criterion that has
a disparate impact on disabled applicants unless the test or criterion has been
validated as a predictor of student success, nor may schools make pre-admission
inquiries about disabilities except under limited circumstances. Id. Cf. Halasz v.
University of New England, 816 F. Supp. 37, 42 n.6 (D. Me. 1993) (rejecting argu-
ment that Scholastic Aptitude Test violates 34 C.F.R. § 104.42); Pandazides v.
Virginia Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Va. 1992) (public school teachers
may be required to show minimum competency on national teacher examination).
50. 34 C.F.R. § 104.43 (1995). The regulation provides:
(a) No qualified handicapped student shall, on the basis of handicap, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be
subjected to discrimination under any academic, research, occupational
training, housing, health insurance, counseling, financial aid, physical
education, athletics, recreation, transportation, other extracurricular, or
other postsecondary education program or activity to which this subpart
applies.
(b) A recipient to which this subpart applies that considers participation
by students in education programs or activities not operated wholly by
the recipient as part of, or equivalent to, an education program or activ-
ity operated by the recipient shall assure itself that the other education
program or activity, as a whole, provides an equal opportunity for the
participation of qualified handicapped persons.
(c) A recipient to which this subpart applies may not, on the basis of
handicap, exclude any qualified handicapped student from any course,
course of study, or other part of its education program or activity.
(d) A recipient to which this subpart applies shall operate its programs
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate.
Id.
51. 34 C.F.R. § 104.45 (1995)(requires recipients who provide housing to non-dis-
abled students to provide comparable, accessible housing to disabled students).
52. Id. § 104.45 (rule of non-discrimination in administering financial aid and em-
ployment services).
53. Id. § 104.46(a)(1),(2) (requires equal opportunity for participation in the most in-
tegrated setting).
54. Id. § 104.46(b)(rule of non-discrimination; prohibits counseling disabled students
toward more restrictive career opportunities than other students with similar
abilities).
55. Id. § 104.46(c) (prohibition of discrimination in membership practices).
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Restrictions on admissions procedures can, however, affect academic
judgments significantly. A decision to admit a student generally en-
tails a judgment that an applicant is academically qualified to partici-
pate in a program. Institutions traditionally base these decisions, in
part, on standardized tests such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(S.A.T.), the Law School Aptitude Test (L.S.A.T.) or the Graduate Rec-
ord Examination (G.R.E.). A federal rule regulating reliance on these
traditional criteria of academic preparation and aptitude is potentially
a significant limitation on academic discretion.
Academic judgments are directly affected by Subpart E's rules for
"academic adjustments."56 The Department of Education requires
that post-secondary institutions make accommodations in four areas.
First, and perhaps most important, post-secondary institutions are
obliged to alter academic requirements if necessary "to ensure that
such requirements do not discriminate or have the effect of discrimi-
nating, on the basis of handicap, against a qualified handicapped ap-
plicant or student."' 7 Among the examples of adjustments given in
the rule are: "changes in the length of time permitted for the comple-
tion of degree requirements, substitution of specific courses required
for the completion of degree requirements, and adaptation of the man-
ner in which specific courses are conducted."58 Yet the regulations
stop short of an open-ended requirement to accommodate. Institu-
tions need not make academic adjustments which "the recipient can
demonstrate are essential to the program of instruction being pursued
by such student or to any directly related licensing requirement
... ."59 Second, a section entitled "other rules" forbids the imposition
of rules that have the effect of limiting participation such as prohibit-
ing tape recorders or guide dogs in classrooms.60 Third, schools must
employ testing methods that measure achievement rather than the
student's impairment.61 Finally, recipients must provide auxiliary
aids, such as interpreters or taped texts, for students with communi-
cations impairments. 62 Schools need not, however, supply personal
devices such as hearing aids.63
Judicial interpretation of the otherwise qualified element and its
implementing regulations began with Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis.64 In its first interpretation of Section 504, the United
States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the issue of who is other-
56. Id. § 104.44.
57. Id. § 104.44(a).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 104.44(b).
61. Id. § 104.44(c).
62. Id. § 104.44(d).
63. Id. § 104.44(d)(2).
64. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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wise qualified under Section 504 and what academic accommodations
a recipient must make. In Davis, plaintiff applied for admission to a
nursing program. During the admissions process, it became clear that
plaintiff suffered from a serious hearing impairment.65 She could de-
tect sounds with the assistance of a hearing aid but could not distin-
guish speech patterns.66 Her principal method of communication was
lip-reading. 67 She was eventually denied admission on the ground
that her inability to hear vocal commands would jeopardize the safety
of her patients and herself in nursing practice and in the school's
clinical training program.68 Additionally, the school concluded that
any modifications in the program would make the clinical program
pointless. 69
Plaintiff argued that Section 504 obligated defendant to take af-
firmative action to counter the effects of her disability. Specifically,
she called for individual supervision by faculty and, more importantly,
waiver of certain required courses. 70 Plaintiff's theory was that she
could work as a registered nurse in situations where lip-reading would
be sufficient, such as an industrial facility or a physician's office.71 In
such instances, clinical training would not be critical. Hence the
school, she argued, was obligated to make appropriate curricular mod-
ifications under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(H.E.W.) regulations then in effect.72
In finding that the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified, the Court
took a narrow view of a recipient's obligation under the Act. Section
504, the Court reasoned, did not require educational institutions to
disregard an applicant's disability.73 Rather, the Act's prohibition
against exclusion of otherwise qualified individuals simply meant that
a recipient could not base a decision to exclude an individual on the
mere existence of a disability.74 Decisions about a plaintiff's ability to
65. Id. at 400.
66. Id. at 401.
67. Id. at 401.
68. Id. School authorities specifically feared that plaintiff would not be able to com-
municate in an operating room where surgical masks are worn, and would not be
able to respond immediately to vocal instructions from physicians when quick
action was needed. Id. at 403.
69. Id. at 401-03.
70. Id. at 407-08.
71. Id. at 408 n.8.
72. See id. at 409 n.9, citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978), now codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.44(a) (1995).
73. The Fourth Circuit had ruled that Section 504 required that the defendant not
take plaintiff's hearing impairment into account. Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis, 574 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (4th Cir. 1978). Taken literally, the
Supreme Court noted, such an interpretation would result in otherwise qualified
blind persons being hired as bus drivers. Id. at 407 n.7.
74. Id. at 404.
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function in a particular environment must be informed by specific
facts, not by stereotypes. 75 An otherwise qualified person, therefore,
was "one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of
his handicap."76 Institutions, moreover, were under no obligation to
make substantial alterations in their programs. Such a requirement
would amount to affirmative action that was not required by the Act's
rule against discrimination. 77 To the extent that the implementing
regulations required such affirmative conduct, they were invalid.78
Applying these principles to the facts of Davis, the Court concluded
that granting the plaintiff a waiver of clinical training would require a
fundamental alteration of the defendant's academic program. Thus,
the defendant was not obliged to undertake such accommodations on
plaintiff's behalf. The Court acknowledged that the line between af-
firmative action and discrimination was blurry and that it was "possi-
ble" that a recipient's failure to make modifications under some
circumstances might be discriminatory, particularly if those changes
did not entail undue financial and administrative burdens or if tech-
nological advances facilitated participation. 79 However, the Court of-
fered no test for identifying such situations.
Davis was a controversial decision. Although it can be faulted for
reaching a questionable factual conclusion,80 most commentary fo-
cused on the Court's definition of an otherwise qualified person.81 The
75. Id. at 405.
76. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 410.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 412-13.
80. See, e.g., Timothy M. Cook & Frank J. Laski, Beyond Davis: Equality of Opportu-
nity for Higher Education for Disabled Students under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 415,427-32 (1980) (noting graduation of hearing
impaired students from nursing programs).
81. See, e.g., Cook & Laski, supra note 80 at 427-32, 438-40, 450-59; Judith Welch
Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportu-
nity without Respect to Handicap under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 69 CoRNmLL L. REv. 401, 452-56 (1984)(discussing court's focus on plain
meaning of the phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"); Marie P.
Cohen, Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap: The Status of Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 65 IowA L. REv. 446 (1980)(detailing statutory
analysis of "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"); Note, Mending the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 701 (arguing for more precise inter-
pretation of phrase "qualified handicapped person"); Thomas L. Forsythe, Note,
Protections for the Handicapped in Federally Financed Programs and Southeast-
ern Community College v. Davis, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1981)(arguing that the
definition of an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" should include
those who meet program requirements except for limitations imposed by their
handicap); Ronald B. Hauben, Note, A Campus Handicap? Disabled Students
and the Right to Higher Education - Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 163 (1980)(discussing court's narrow interpreta-
tion of the phrase "otherwise qualified."); Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
obvious effect of the "in spite of" standard was to severely limit the
class of persons protected by the Act. In higher education, a rigor-
ously applied Davis standard would have had the effect of protecting
persons with impairments that are irrelevant to the learning process,
such as cosmetic disfigurement or loss of limb. Ironically, these per-
sons would have required no accommodation, reasonable or otherwise.
Persons with disabilities that affect learning such as learning disabili-
ties, blindness, or hearing impairments would not have met the aca-
demic requirements of most programs and therefore would have been
deemed not otherwise qualified.
Aware of the difficulties caused by the Davis opinion, the Court
revisited the otherwise qualified issue in Alexander v. Choate,82 a
class action challenge to the State of Tennessee's decision to reduce
Medicaid program costs by limiting the number of inpatient hospital
days.83 Resolution of the controversy depended, in part,84 on the
State's obligation as a federal recipient under the Rehabilitation Act
to make reasonable accommodations in administering its Medicaid
program. The Court acknowledged that its imprecise use of the term
"affirmative action" in Davis caused great confusion.8 5 Affirmative ac-
tion, the Court stated, customarily refers to a remedial policy designed
to correct past discrimination while reasonable accommodation refers
to removal of existing obstacles against the disabled.86 The Court
stated:
Regardless of the aptness of our choice of words in Davis, it is clear from the
context of Davis that the term "affirmative action" referred to those "changes,"
"adjustments," or "modifications" to existing programs that would be "sub-
stantial"... or that would constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the nature
of the program . . . rather than to those changes that would be reasonable
accommodations. 87
Alexander recast the accommodation issue as one of "meaningful
access."88 Characterizing the issue as a balance between the right of
the disabled to be integrated into society and the right of federal
grantees to preserve the integrity of their programs, the Court held
the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination under Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881 (1980)(articulating an expanded view of the
meaning of discrimination in the context of handicapped persons); Olenick, supra
note 40.
82. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
83. Id. at 289-90.
84. Before reaching the reasonable accommodation issue, the Court first had to re-
solve the issue of whether Section 504 reached beyond intentional discrimination
to prohibit actions with discriminatory effect. The Court held that it did. See id.
at 299.
85. Id. at 300 n.20.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 301.
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that federal recipients are required to make reasonable accommoda-
tions that permit disabled individuals meaningful access to the pro-
gram in question. Alexander thus resolved the ambiguity left by Davis
and confirmed that federal grantees must make program modifica-
tions that are not unduly burdensome nor fundamentally alter their
programs. On the other hand, Alexander did nothing to clarify the
concept of "meaningful access" or "reasonable accommodation" except
to say that modifications should not affect program integrity. As one
court noted, "the question after Alexander is the rather mushy one of
whether some 'reasonable accommodation' is available to satisfy the
legitimate interests of both the grantee and the handicapped
person."89
C. The Americans With Disabilities Act
1. Introduction
On January 26, 1990, President Bush signed the Americans with
Disabilities Act 90 into law. It was instantly heralded as the most sig-
nificant civil rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.91
Sections of the Act establish far reaching rules against disability
discrimination in the most important aspects of life: employment, 92
public services,93 public accommodations,94 transportation 95 and tele-
communication.96 As a general matter, it is fair to say that the A.D.A.
universalizes the protections of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
by extending coverage to entities that do not receive federal financial
assistance.97 The Act's definition of a disabled individual essentially
reiterates the corresponding definition under the Rehabilitation Act,98
and its provisions continue the concepts of equal opportunity99 and
89. Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988).
90. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (codified at 42 U.S.C-.A § 12101 et seq.).
91. See, e.g., Terry Wilson, For the Disabled, It's Yndependence Day,' Cm. Tam., July
27, 1990, p.1; Don Shannon, Spirits Soar as Disabled Rights Becomes the Law,
L.A. TnzEs, July 27, 1990, p. 1; A Law for Every American, N.Y. Tivms, July 27,
1990, p. A26. See generally TUCKER & GOLDSTEiN, supra note 21, at 21:1-3.
92. 42 U.S.C-.A §§ 12111-12117 (West Supp. 1995).
93. Id. §§ 12131-12165 (West Supp. 1995).
94. Id. §§ 12181-12189 (West Supp. 1995).
95. Id. §§ 12141-12165 (West Supp. 1995) (public transportation systems); Id.
§§ 12182(b)(2)(B-C), 12184-12186 (West Supp. 1995)(privately operated systems).
96. Pub. L. No. 101-336, Title IV, 104 Stat. 327, 366 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 152,
221, 225, 661 (1991)) (telecommunications provisions).
97. RoTHmsT , supra note 10, § 1.02, 2.03.
98. The A-DA- defines "disability" with respect to an individual as: "A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual; B) a record of such an impairment; or C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C-.A § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1995).
99. See, e.g., id. § 12101(a)(8).
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reasonable accommodationslOO as well as the defenses of undue bur-
denslO' and fundamental program alterations 0 2 that were developed
under the Section 504 case law.
Post-secondary institutions are covered under either Title II or Ti-
tle III of the Act. In most respects, the A.D.A. did not change the oper-
ating environment for higher education. Virtually all post-secondary
institutions are federal grantees and hence already bound by Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.103 As noted below, the anti-discrimina-
tion mandates of Titles II and III and their implementing regulations
are essentially the same as those under Section 504.104 Moreover,
Congress did not repeal Section 504 even though it had become largely
superfluous. Instead, it chose to insure that the rule structure of the
two statutes would be compatible. The Act contains a general rule of
construction forbidding courts to apply a lesser standard than what is
required by Section 504 and its regulations.105 Similarly, Department
of Justice regulations implementing Titles II and III specifically state
that neither should be construed to afford less protection than the Re-
habilitation Act.106 The effects of the A.D.A. are therefore largely psy-
chological, at least as far as academic modifications are concerned.107
2. Title H
Title II of the A.D.A. covers services, programs, and activities of
public entities, 08 including state and local government run institu-
tions of higher education. The Act protects "qualified individual[s]
with a disability"'09 by providing that:
... no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
100. See, e.g., id. §§ 12131(2); 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
101. See, e.g., id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
102. See, e.g., id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i-iii).
103. RoTHST N, supra note 10, § 7.01.
104. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (Supp. V 1993).
106. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (1995) (Title ID; id. § 36.103(a) (Title III).
107. See generally Wayne A. Hill, Jr., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Signifi-
cant Overlap with Section 504 for Colleges and Universities, 18 J. C. & U. L. 389,
415-17 (1992)("Most university officials felt they are ahead of any other sector of
the economy in making facilities accessible to the disabled.").
108. Public entities are defined by the Act as follows:
As used in this subchapter:
(1) Public entity. The term "public entity" means-
(A) any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality
of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter author-
ity (as defined in section 502(8) of Title 45). 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (Supp. V 1993).
109. Id. at § 12132.
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programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.1 10
In order to allege successfully a Title II claim, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that he or she: (1) has a disability; (2) is otherwise qualified for
the benefit in question; (3) was excluded from participation in the ben-
efit due to discrimination solely on the basis of disability; and, (4) the
defendant is a state or local government entity.'
Much like the language of Section 504, Title H is crafted in general
terms. Implementing regulations issued by the Department of Justice
(D.O.J.) establishes several principles for the enforcement of Title II,
including requirements that a covered entity cannot deny the opportu-
nity to participate in a service, 11 2 fail to provide an equal opportunity
to participate,113 provide a benefit that is not as effective in allowing
an opportunity to achieve the same result as others,114 nor provide
benefits that are different or separate from those given to others.15
Certain specific D.O.J. regulations are especially significant for
higher education. First, covered entities are obliged to make modifica-
tions in their practices, policies, and procedures to avoid discrimina-
tion unless such alterations would cause a fundamental alteration in
the nature of the service.1 6 Second, covered entities must provide
auxiliary aids and services of a non-personal nature117 unless doing so
would fundamentally alter their activities."-8 Finally, the regulations
forbid the use of eligibility criteria which screen out or tend to screen
out protected individuals unless the criteria are necessary to offer a
public entity's services."39
Neither Title H nor its regulations provide specific rules for higher
education. Unlike Titles I and HI, Congress opted to rely on a gener-
ally worded prohibition against discrimination rather than set out a
list of discriminatory acts. Congress intended simply to extend the
prohibitions of Section 504 to all activities of state and local govern-
ment.120 Nonetheless, the Act's rule of construction requiring consis-
tency with Title V of the Rehabilitation Act should resolve any
questions arising from the generality of Title II and its regulations.
For example, the requirement that covered entities make modifica-
110. Id.
111. Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir.
1995).
112. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(B)(1)(i) (1995).
113. Id. § 35.130(B)(1)(ii).
114. Id. § 35.130(B)(1)(iii).
115. Id. § 35.130(B)(1)(iv).
116. Id. § 35.130(b)(7).
117. Id. § 35.160(b)(1)(requiring auxiliary aids and services); § 35.135 (exempting
items of a personal nature).
118. Id. § 35.164.
119. Id. § 35.130(b)(8).
120. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84 (1990).
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tions in their practices and policies' 2 ' must be read in light of the
Section 504 regulations requiring "academic adjustments.1 22
Perhaps the most important facet of Title II for academic decision-
making is the adoption of the "otherwise qualified" standard from the
Section 504 case law. Title II protects "otherwise qualified individuals
with disabilities" which it defines as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the partici-
pation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 12 3
This definition tracks the concept of the otherwise qualified individual
under the Rehabilitation Act as developed by the courts.' 2 4 The other-
wise qualified standard is also reflected in the "fundamental altera-
tion" exception to regulations governing modifications in practices and
policies, auxiliary aids and services, and use of eligibility criteria.12 5
3. Title III
Title III prohibits discrimination against the disabled by public ac-
commodations126 and specifically includes "undergraduate, or post-
graduate private school[s] or other place[s] of education1 2 7 in its
definition of public accommodation. The elements of a Title III claim
are identical to those in a Title II claim, except that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant is a public accommodation rather
than a public entity.128 Title III contains a broadly stated rule against
discrimination129 as well as a number of rules of construction which
resemble the Title II regulations, both in language and in lack of spe-
cific reference to higher education. Public accommodations may not
deny benefits on the basis of disabilitylso or provide unequal'13 or sep-
121. 28 C.F.R. § 35.135 (1995).
122. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (1995).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp. V 1993).
124. See supra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 121821(a) (Supp. V 1995).
127. Id. § 12181(7)(J).
128. Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case on showing that 1) he or she is disabled; 2)
defendant is a public accommodation; and, 3) plaintiff was denied a benefit on
account of disability. See Mayberry v. Von Valatier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1164
(E.D. Mich. 1994)(listing elements of prima facie case).
129. "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodations." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a) (Supp. V 1995).
130. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
131. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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arate132 benefits. They must offer services in the most integrated set-
ting possible.13s
Three specific prohibitions, already familiar from the section 504
and Title II regulations, have equivalent implications for academic de-
cision making. Covered entities may not: 1) use eligibility criteria
which unnecessarily screen out or tend to screen out a disabled indi-
vidual or a class of disabled individuals; 34 2) fail to make reasonable
modifications in policies or practices unless such changes would work
a fundamental alteration in the goods or services;135 and 3) fail to pro-
vide auxiliary aids and services unless doing so would fundamentally
alter the nature of the goods or services or impose an undue bur-
den.136 As with Title II, any difficulties created by the lack of specific
reference to post-secondary institutions should be cured by the re-
quirement that the Act be construed consistently with Section 504.137
So far as academic decision-making is concerned, there is no signif-
icant difference between Title II and Title III of the Act. Both public
and private post-secondary institutions are required to make reason-
able program modifications short of a fundamental change in the na-
ture of those programs. Title III curiously fails to refer to the
"qualified individual with a disability"'38 specified in Title II and in-
stead forbids discrimination against "individuals"139 in the operation
of public accommodations. The failure to limit coverage to qualified
individuals in Title III might be taken as an intent to abandon the
otherwise qualified standard in this part of the Act. The more natural
explanation for this wording is that one does not normally think of
"qualifications" in the same context as accommodations that are open
to the public.140 References to fundamental alterations and undue
burden in other parts of Title III also make clear Congress' intent to
carry the otherwise qualified standard of Section 504 and Title II over
into Title III.
III. INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Any attempt to regulate institutions of higher learning, including
the Rehabilitation and Americans with Disabilities Acts, raises the
132. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
133. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B).
134. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
135. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
136. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
137. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp. V 1993)(emphasis added).
139. Id. § 12182(a).
140. See Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination: Discriminatory Non-
treatment of Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1645 n.253
(1993)("one does not normally think of needing to be 'qualified' to eat at a restau-
rant, visit a museum, or go to a doctor's office...").
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possibility of interference with academic freedom. Academic institu-
tions in the United States have enjoyed remarkable freedom from ju-
dicial scrutiny.141 Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to review
decisions of universities in academic matters. The classic statement of
institutional autonomy is Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.142 Sweezy reversed a contempt citation
against a university professor who refused to co-operate with a Mc-
Carthy-era investigation of his classroom activities. The majority
opinion recognized a First Amendment right of academic freedom
which protected individual teachers from state intrusion into the
classroom.143
The Court feared that restrictions on inquiry and expression
within universities would jeopardize the search for knowledge and
would imperil democratic self-government by denying students an op-
portunity for maturity and understanding by way of exposure to com-
peting ideas.144 While agreeing that free societies depended upon
freedom of inquiry, Frankfurter nonetheless saw the wrong in this
case to be against the university and not the individual teacher. In his
view, society's need for knowledge was secured by permitting universi-
ties to create an atmosphere of intellectual inquiry free from interfer-
ence by civil and political authorities. He identified academic freedom
with the "four essential freedoms" of the university set out by a group
of South African professors in an earlier era: "to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."145
A. First Amendment Protections of Institutional Academic
Freedom
As a matter of constitutional law, academic freedom is widely per-
ceived as a First Amendment right of free expression held by individ-
ual faculty members and enforceable against state authorities,
including state universities themselves.146 Leading cases on aca-
141. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989)(describing the system of academic freedom
in relation to the Constitution); Virginia D. Nordin, The Contract to Educate: To-
ward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C. &
U.L. 141 (1981-82)(one of the strongest exceptions to judicial intervention has
been "academic abstention.").
142. 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
143. Id. at 249-55.
144. Id. at 250-51.
145. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (quoting THm OPEN UNIvEsrrEs
IN SouTH AFRICA 10-12)(emphasis added).
146. See, e.g., WuIL m W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AmNDMENT
52 (1984); Arthur Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, in 1 Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences 384 (1930); William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic
Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC
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demic freedom such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire147 and Keyishian v.
Board of Regentsl48 affirm the right of individual university teachers
to express views free of interference by academic or civil authorities.
These decisions reflect a philosophy that campuses should be free
markets of ideas which the state has no interest in controlling.149 In-
stitutional academic freedom as described by Frankfurter has also
been recognized, although less forcefully, as a First Amendment
value.
Sweezy was the first Supreme Court case to equate institutional
academic freedom with First Amendment protections. Institutional
academic freedom reappears twenty-one years later in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.15o In Bakke, a plurality of the
Supreme Court struck down a special admissions program at the Uni-
versity of California at Davis medical school which reserved 16 of 100
seats in each entering class for minority students. The Court held
that the special admissions program was violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clausel51 and Title VI.152
Justice Powell's plurality opinion, however, refused to bar any con-
sideration of race in admissions. Drawing on Frankfurter's concur-
rence in Sweezy, Powell argued that the composition of a class was an
academic prerogative.'1 3 Fourth among the "four essential freedoms"
of a university identified by Frankfurter was the right to decide "who
may be admitted to study." Powell placed great emphasis on the com-
monly held belief of university officials that diversity in a student body
FREEDOM 59 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed. 1972); American Association of University
Professors, Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 1940;
Byrne, supra note 141, at 267-311 (discussing development of individual right
theory); David Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv.
3 (academic freedom is essential if education is to accomplish its role in a demo-
cratic society); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America, 66 Tax. L. REV. 1265 (1988)(reviews history of
AAUP and judicial concepts of personal autonomy concept); Robert M. ONeil,
Academic Freedom and the Constitution, 11 J.C. & U. L. 275, 280-83 (1984); Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
DuKE L.J. 841 (detailing substantive rights of teachers); Mark G. Yudof, Three
Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REv. 831, 832-37 (1987)(development of
personal autonomy concept); Comment, Testing the Limits of Academic Freedom,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 712, 712 (1982) (Supreme Court recognizes individual aca-
demic freedom).
147. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion).
148. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
149. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603. (For a discussion of the role of free expression in the university,
see generally Yale University, Report of the Committee of Freedom of Expression
at Yale University (1975) (Woodward Committee Report)).
150. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 311-19.
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was necessary to expose students to a variety of persons, ideas, and
viewpoints; this practice in turn contributed to an atmosphere of spec-
ulation and inquiry which promoted learning.154 Race was therefore
one of many factors such as geographic origin, personal talents, work
experience, and compassion for the poor which a university could con-
sider on an individual basis in making an admissions decision.1 55 To
Powell, a state university's interest in creating a beneficial educa-
tional environment was sufficiently compelling to permit a limited
consideration of race in admissions and to overcome any objections
based on the Equal Protection Clause.156
While confirming a constitutional status for institutional academic
autonomy, Bakke may prove to be the high water mark of First
Amendment protections of institutional academic privileges.15 7 Since
Bakke, the Court has failed to give any definite contours to this consti-
tutional doctrine.158 In Widmar v. Vincent1 5 9 the Court disapproved
of a state university's policy against the use of university facilities for
religious exercises. Apparently perceiving no distinction between a
state university and other state agencies, the Court viewed the re-
striction as an impermissible content based restriction on speech in a
public forum. 160 One could argue that regulating the content of stu-
154. Id. at 311-15.
155. Id. at 317-18.
156. Id. at 315-19.
157. Some commentators have taken a cynical view that Justice Powell's reliance on
institutional autonomy may have been a gentle device to preserve affirmative ac-
tion policies rather than a view of academic freedom. See, e.g., J. HARViE WILn-
SON, FROM BRowN TO BA=K 303-04 (1979); Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas:
Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC.
79, 86-87 (1995)(asserting that only a lawyer as practiced as Justice Powell could
simultaneously denounce as impermissible the rise of racial classifications and
approve precisely such a practice); Yudof, supra note 146, at 855-56. Professor
Byrne has argued that the institutional autonomy theory in Bakke has more vi-
tality than was suggested by the initial, cynical reaction of some. He noted, how-
ever, that the Court has failed to provide it with "a definite sphere of influence or
an adequate constitutional justification." Byrne, supra note 141, at 315-16.
Byrne's optimism about institutional autonomy may now appear overstated in
light of the intervening decisions in the University of Pennsylvania and Rosenber-
ger cases. See infra notes 165-81 and accompanying text. Professor Metzger also
saw a constitutional trend away from institutional neutrality toward institu-
tional prerogative after the Widmar decision. See Metzger, supra note 146, at
1321-22. His conclusion is susceptible to the same objection.
158. Byrne, supra note 141, at 315-16.
159. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
160. Id. at 267-74. The Court reasoned that the university established a public forum
by opening its facilities to student groups. Id. at 267-68. Moreover, the Court
found that the university imposed content based restrictions on expression by
forbidding the use of the university facilities by groups engaging in worship or
professing a religious viewpoint. Id. at 268-70. The Court rejected the univer-
sity's argument that the policy reflected a compelling state interest in avoiding
the Establishment of Religion inasmuch as an open-forum policy would not have
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dent activities on campus is as much an academic prerogative as the
right to promote diversity in student bodies which was recognized in
Bakke. Yet only Justice Stevens took this view. He argued that the
compelling state interest test was inappropriate in a campus environ-
ment where the speech content of student (and other) activities was
directly related to the educational process.' 6 ' Stevens felt that aca-
demic freedom permitted a university to make judgments about how it
would utilize its limited resources to pursue educational goals. He
would have permitted a university to make the same choices about
facility usage as it does when selecting books or devising a
curriculum. 162
No other justice joined in Stevens' concurrence. It should be noted
that Stevens' view of institutional autonomy was not absolute. He
would not permit a state university to discriminate against particular
viewpoints once it had approved a student activity.163 The majority
gave lip service to Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy by briefly ac-
knowledging the right of academic institutions to make academic
judgments.' 64 Theories of institutional autonomy, however, played no
role in the majority's analysis.
University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission165 further narrowed the scope of institutional academic
freedom. The University had attempted to quash a subpoena of confi-
dential peer review materials issued by the E.E.O.C. during an inves-
tigation of a Title VII claim.166 Invoking Frankfurter's concurrence in
Sweezy, the University maintained that the First Amendment pro-
tected its right to determine "on academic grounds who may teach."'167
There is no doubt that the disclosure of confidential peer reviews may
affect the faculty selection process.168 The University argued that loss
of confidentiality would result in less candor in evaluations and, con-
sequently, the hiring and tenuring of less qualified individuals.169
the effect of advancing religion. Id. at 270-74. For a discussion of First Amend-
ment prohibitions on content based speech restrictions, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMmcANq CONST'ITONAL LAw § 12 (2d ed. 1988).
161. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)(Stevens, J., concurring).
162. Id. Justice Stevens noted that under the Court's approach a student group want-
ing to view Mickey Mouse cartoons would have a right to use university facilities
equal to that of a group wanting to practice a performance of Hamlet. Id. at 278.
163. Id. at 280.
164. Id. at 278-79 n.2 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)).
165. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
166. Id. at 186-88.
167. Id. at 197.
168. See Byrne, supra note 141, at 319 (loss of confidentiality diminishes candor in
evaluations).
169. University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 196-
97 (1990).
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The University further contended that disclosure would create an air
of divisiveness and tension that was antithetical to the "free exchange
of ideas that is a hallmark of academic freedom."170 Indeed, to the
extent that institutional academic freedom provides immunity from
civil interference in academic matters, it is difficult to imagine a more
purely academic matter than a tenure decision.
The Court, however, took a limited view of the institutional right
created by Sweezy and progeny. It construed those cases as protecting
universities from content based regulation of university speech and
activities by outside authorities. The crux of the actions in both
Sweezy and Keyishian was an attempt to control the content of class-
room lectures through the intimidation of faculty.171 In contrast, the
subpoena at issue in University of Pennsylvania had no direct effect on
either the content of university speech or on the criteria employed for
granting tenure.' 72 The Court, moreover, considered the relationship
between the disclosure of confidential materials and the feared lower-
ing of personnel standards to be remote 73 and speculative.174
Most recently, in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,175 the
Court rejected a state university's argument that the First Amend-
ment empowered it to refuse to fund a Christian student newspaper.
The University had declined to pay printing costs under a school regu-
lation prohibiting the funding of student publications that promote
religious activities.176 Inasmuch as the University was willing to sub-
sidize publications dealing with the subject of religion except those
taking a religious viewpoint, the majority in Rosenberger had little
trouble in holding that the funding restriction constituted an imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination.177 Relying on Widmar's assurance
that universities must make academic judgments about the allocation
of scarce resources,178 the University contended, in part,179 that aca-
demic funding decisions must consider content and viewpoint in order
to achieve its educational mission.180
The Court responded that Widmar simply recognized that the state
(or its agencies) may make content-based choices when it is the
170. Id. at 197.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 198.
173. Id. at 199-200.
174. Id.
175. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
176. Id. at 2514-15.
177. Id. at 2516-20.
178. Id. at 2518 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)).
179. The university also argued that funding a religious student newspaper would
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 2520-25. The Court
rejected this argument as well. Id.
180. Id. at 2518-20.
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speaker. In Rosenberger, however, independent student organizations
were not state speakers and hence were entitled to participate in a
limited public forum free from viewpoint discrimination.181 Perhaps
the most striking aspect of the decision was the Court's inclination to
treat a university as simply another agency which created a public
forum.
After Rosenberger, it is difficult to measure the boundaries of First
Amendment protection of institutional autonomy. The Supreme
Court continues to recognize institutional academic freedom as a via-
ble First Amendment principle. The Court has cited Frankfurter's
concurrence in Sweezy with approvall82 and has emphasized the im-
portance of protecting institutional prerogatives.I 83 Yet the utility of
this constitutional doctrine in protecting higher education from inter-
ference by civil authorities has been limited. The "essential" freedoms
to determine what is taught and how it is taught have been both con-
firmed and restricted. Rosenberger explicitly recognizes that state
universities 8 4 are free to determine the content of their educational
programs. The Court's conclusion is based on a public university's sta-
tus as a "state speaker" which is free to control the content of its own
speech. 185
As a general matter, state speakers are free to expend money to
promote their own viewpoints and are not required to disseminate
competing views so long as they do not create a forum for private ex-
pression.18 6 Setting aside the awkwardness of classifying a university
as a "state speaker," Rosenberger validates a part of Frankfurter's
view of academic freedom. By recognizing control over the "content" of
its educational program, the Court at least confirmed the power of a
state university to make determinations about curriculum. According
to this logic, a state university should be free to determine what
courses are required of its students in particular programs and what
other requirements a student must meet in order to participate in the
project.
181. Id. at 2519.
182. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (citing
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., concurring
in result)); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (citing Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). See
also Rosenberger v. University of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1995)(citing Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 263 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result))).
183. University of Pa. v. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 199
(1990).
184. Of course, Rosenberger does not address the question of a private university's
right to be free of state interference.
185. See Rosenberger v. University of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518-19 (1995).
186. Id. at 2516-17.
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On the other hand, Rosenberger leaves some limitations against
state universities in place. State schools still have no power to shape
their educational message to promote a particular viewpoint. It is
now black letter wisdom that a state university may not invoke insti-
tutional academic freedom to suppress particular points of view once
it has created a forum for the discussion of a particular matter.18 7 In
addition, Rosenberger solves only part of the puzzle. Rosenberger
deals only with the issue of institutional prerogatives in a state uni-
versity. The court elected to find an institutional power over educa-
tional programming in the university's status as a "state speaker"
rather than attempting to assign to the university a more general
right as an institution of higher learning. While the sheer number of
state supported institutions makes the ruling significant, 3ss "state
speaker" analysis does not apply to private colleges and universities.
Presumably, the Court's general and approving references to Frank-
furter's concurrence indicate that private institutions have a constitu-
tionally protected right to control their curricula and set standards.18 9
187. See Widmar v. Vincent, 455 U.S. 263 (1981); Rosenberger v. University of Va.,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
188. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)(Stevens, J., concurring)(most
colleges and universities are state supported).
189. The Court's failure to articulate a view of institutional academic freedom that
bridges the public-private distinction may reflect the fact that fewer academic
freedom cases from private universities are likely to be litigated as such. By rec-
ognizing academic freedom as a "special concern of the First Amendment," the
Court created a right to be free of government interference. Whether that right
belongs properly to individual faculties, institutions, or both, there can be no vio-
lation of the principle without state action. As a practical matter, controversies
arising in state universities are most likely to involve state action. First, in
claims by individual faculty members regarding university rules or actions, the
school itself is the state agency. Second, some claims involve direct action by
state agencies other than school administrations against faculty. Finally, state
universities may challenge actions by other branches of government. In contrast,
private universities are affected by state action only by the last situation. David
M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic
Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 LAw & CONTMP. PROBs. 227, 231
(1990). Hence it is natural that the Court's development of the institutional aca-
demic freedom doctrine should reflect the dynamic of public university settings.
Of the institutional academic freedom cases, only one involved a private uni-
versity, University of Pennsylvania. The Court commented in a footnote that:
Obvious First Amendment problems would arise where government at-
tempts to direct the content of speech at private universities. Such con-
tent-based regulation of private speech traditionally has carried with it a
heavy burden of justification.... Where, as was the situation in the
academic-freedom cases, government attempts to direct the content of
speech at public educational institutions, complicated First amendment
issues are presented because government is simultaneously both
speaker and regulator.
University of Pa. v. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 198
n.6 (1989). Although the quoted material helps to explain the Court's reluctance
to "define[ ] the precise contours of any academic-freedom right," id. at 198,
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The institutional academic freedom cases also preserve a signifi-
cant measure of university control over issues of who may teach and
who may be admitted to study. Rosenberger's declaration that state
schools are free to determine the content of their educational pro-
grams can be read to include related matters such as standards for
faculty. Teacher characteristics bear an obvious relationship to the
conduct of instruction and campus discourse. Hence, university hiring
criteria based on intellect, educational achievement, knowledge of a
specialty, life experience, or particular philosophy are so closely linked
to educational programming that they should receive constitutional
protection from outside review. Universities have a similar interest in
screening potential students for their ability to contribute to the edu-
cational experience of a university.190
The Court does not pursue this point in Rosenberger. However, in
both University of Pennsylvania and Bakke, the Court appeared to
confirm a university's power to set standards for faculty and students.
University of Pennsylvanial91 acknowledged a university's power to
set non-discriminatory academic criteria for tenuring decisions. There
the Court voiced concerns about the dangers to academic freedom im-
plicit in allowing outside authorities to influence university hiring cri-
teria192 as well as the traditional respect of courts for professional
where state universities are involved, it does nothing to resolve the question of
whether institutional academic freedom has a different meaning in a private uni-
versity. Indeed, it does nothing to distinguish the First Amendment rights of a
private university from those of an individual.
190. The awkwardness of using a "state speaker" theory of institutional prerogative is
illustrated by the matter of student performance evaluations. There is little
doubt that Justice Frankfurter's view of the freedom to decide on academic
grounds who may be admitted to study entails the power to determine whether a
student's academic progress is satisfactory. Fitting this academic prerogative
into the "state speaker" rationale is challenging at the least. The Rosenberger
Court apparently viewed curricular determinations in that case as a form of state
generated communication protected by Rust v. Sullivan. Rosenberger v. Univer-
sity of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518-19 (1995)(citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
174 (1991)). Under this logic, a variety of academic standards might become con-
stitutionally protected institutional prerogatives. For example, a requirement
that all undergraduates take a physics course can be construed as part of a uni-
versity's message about what an educated person should know in the late 20th
century. A decision that a student has not passed a physics course is more diffi-
cult to pigeon-hole as a form of communication. The student's transcript does
indeed convey information about that student but has little do with a university's
message about the role of science in modern life. It has no more communicative
value than the revocation of a drivers license. Similarly, a decision not to admit a
student with low high school grades does not reflect any particular viewpoint.
191. University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n, 493 U.S.
182, 192-201 (1990).
192. Id. at 198 (referring to state attempts to influence classroom speech in
Keyishian).
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academic judgments.' 93 Bakke,19 4 as already noted, emphasized the
traditional freedom enjoyed by universities to make academic judg-
ments in assembling student bodies.
It is obvious, however, that the Court is unwilling to allow concepts
of institutional academic freedom to interfere with the equally signifi-
cant attempts by the federal government to eliminate discrimination
in American society, including its campuses. Significantly, the Court
has never struck down a federal statute on grounds of constitutionally
protected institutional autonomy: Bakke subjects higher education to
Title VI while University of Pennsylvania does the same for Title VII.
In University of Pennsylvania, the Court was uncomfortable with
the prospect of creating a broad institutional freedom to control all
internal processes with academic implications. Obviously aware of
the implications for enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws, the
Court implied that claims of institutional academic freedom must bear
some relation to "academic speech"'195 or "university discourse."196
Nevertheless, the damage done to institutional autonomy is probably
minimal. Review of internal processes under federal civil rights stat-
utes represents a limited intrusion into the academic realm. More-
over, imposing public policies against discrimination on universities
via legislation such as Title VI and Title VII should not affect a genu-
inely academic decision. Discrimination on the basis of race or gender
is simply not an academic value. In this sense federal anti-discrimina-
tion laws and institutional autonomy are compatible.197
Under the current state of law, post-secondary institutions should
not be able to avoid the requirements of Section 504 or the A.D.A. by
taking refuge in a constitutionally protected institutional academic
freedom. It is reasonably clear, though the parameters are fuzzy, that
public and private institutions of higher learning have a certain con-
stitutionally protected right to set academic standards in the nature of
admissions criteria, course requirements, and minimum performance
standards for students. Nevertheless, these First Amendment rights
cannot be read to nullify the power of Congress to protect "otherwise
qualified" disabled persons. Perhaps the pivotal case is University of
Pennsylvania. Both the federal policies against race and gender dis-
crimination in educational settings and the federal policy forbidding
193. Id. at 199 (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225(1985)).
194. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
195. University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 195
(1990).
196. Id.
197. The question of how much damage is done to peer evaluations by breach of confi-
dentiality is also debatable. Even Professor Byrne, a proponent of institutional
autonomy, acknowledges that there is no empirical information on this point and
that the damage might be diminished by protective orders. See Byrne, supra note
141, at 319-20.
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discrimination against the disabled are compatible with, and perhaps
unrelated to, academic matters. Universities have no more interest in
discriminating against the disabled than against minorities or women.
Analogies to race and gender discrimination, however, are tenuous.
The term discrimination connotes not so much a fact as a legal conclu-
sion that certain behavior is inappropriate. Any consideration of race
and gender, at least of a negative sort, by a university is impermissi-
ble. Yet, as explained in Part II, taking disability into account does
not, of itself, amount to discrimination under Section 504 or Titles II
and III of the A.D.A. Discrimination occurs only when a covered en-
tity denies a benefit on the basis of stereotyped attitudes (i.e., the disa-
bility is irrelevant) or refuses to make a reasonable accommodation
(i.e., the disability is insignificant). Neither action amounts to an aca-
demic judgment. In those situations the logic of University of Penn-
sylvania and Bakke should prevail and subject universities to a rule of
non-discrimination outside of its core academic areas.
By not requiring universities to make fundamental alterations in
their programs or incur undue expenses, however, Section 504 and the
A.D.A. stop short of what is the likely constitutionally protected area
of academic decision making. Institutional prerogatives in the area of
curriculum appear to have survived Rosenberger intact. Davis ex-
plained this limitation by finding that Congress did not intend to place
covered entities under an affirmative action mandate. One could ar-
gue that the same result is required under the theory of institutional
academic autonomy. For example, the power to deny admission to a
disabled person who is not "otherwise qualified" is part of a univer-
sits constitutionally protected freedom to set standards, i.e., the es-
sential freedom to determine on academic grounds who may be
admitted to study. Additionally, one could argue that questions of rea-
sonable accommodations involving waivers of standards are constitu-
tionally exempted from judicial review by reason of the essential
freedoms to determine on academic grounds what is taught and how it
is taught. No reported case under Section 504 or the A.D.A. appears
to consider this particular argument. The absence of constitutional
argument on this point is due, in part, to the reasoning adopted by
Davis, but also to the existence of a non-constitutional doctrine of aca-
demic abstention.
B. Academic Abstention
Since the late 19th Century, American courts have observed a com-
mon law principle of not interfering in internal academic decisions.19 8
198. See Byrne, supra note 141, at 323-31; Nordin, supra note 141, at 146-47. Earlier
courts also took a laissez faire attitude toward colleges based on a property the-
ory. See Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 Tax. L.
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As a general rule, a court will not review a university decision in a
purely academic matter, especially grading, without some showing of
arbitrarinessl99 or a countervailing statute.200 Arguments that a stu-
dent was entitled to a remedy based on his contract with the school
are generally turned aside by construing the agreement to give the
school a high degree of discretion in making and applying academic
standards.2O1
Professor Byrne objects to labeling the practice of academic absten-
tion a "doctrine" because of the failure of the courts to develop a con-
sistent rationale in applying it or even to explain the need for
academic discretion.202 Nonetheless, abstention has occurred with re-
markable consistency over the years. 20 3 The result has been that ac-
tions based on a breach of contract theory are nearly always decided in
the school's favor.204
Byrne suggests three purposes (if not explanations) for the unwill-
ingness to question academic judgments. First, older cases reflected a
belief that broad discretion is necessary to enable universities to con-
trol student behavior while acting in loco parentis. Since contempo-
rary higher education takes little interest in the moral development of
students, this rationale is no longer important. 20 5 Second, Byrne sug-
REv. 817, 839-40 (1983)("It sufficies to say... that the claim of [academic] auton-
omy asserted... is, primarily as an excresence of property rights...").
199. See, e.g., Hines v. Rinker, 667 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1981)(medical student);
Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976)(education student); Con-
nelly v. University of Vt. & State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt.
1965)(medical student); Susan M. v. New York Law Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1104 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1990)(nursing student); Johnson v. Cuyahoga County Community Col-
lege, 489 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio Misc. 1985)(nursing student); McIntosh v. Borough
of Manhattan Community College, 443 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)(nursing
student); Paulsen v. Golden Gate Univ., 159 Cal. Rptr. 858 (Cal. 1979)(en
banc)(law student); Maitland v. Wayne State Univ. Medical Sch., 257 N.W.2d 195
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977)(medical student); Miltana v. University of Miami, 236 So.
2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971)(medical stu-
dent); Mustell v. Rose, 211 So. 2d 489 (Ala. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936
(1968)(medical student); Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958)(education student); Edde v. Columbia Univ., 168 N.Y.S.2d
643 (Sup. Ct. 1957)(Ph.D. candidate).
200. See, e.g., Berea College v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623 (Ky. 1906) aff'd, 211 U.S.
45 (1908)(upholding statute forbidding education of persons of different races in
same institution).
201. Byrne, supra note 141, at 324 (citing Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435
(A.D. 1928)). Professor Byrne notes that the level of discretion that the courts
find in most contracts between colleges and students would be sufficient to void a
commercial contract for lack of mutuality. Id. See also Nordin, supra note 141,
at 145-46 (academic abstention consistently applied).
202. Byrne, supra note 141, at 323, 325. See also Nordin, supra note 141, at 146.
203. Byrne, supra note 141, at 323.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 325.
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gests that the courts have viewed the academy as a "separate
realm" 20 6 governed by values and processes which are different from
the larger society. Under this view, personal relations within the uni-
versity community are guided to achieve pedagogical goals. Subject-
ing such relationships and the discretion that guides them to a legal
remedy would, in this view, be destructive. 207 It is probably signifi-
cant that the cases that Byrnes cites for this proposition are older.208
Contemporary cases do not take this viewpoint explicitly.2 09 How-
ever, some remnant of this view exists in the consistent refusal of
courts to recognize a Due Process right to the active participation of
lawyers in disciplinary hearings on the ground that adversarial proce-
dures are inimical to student-faculty relations.210
The final and most important rationale for academic abstention is
the perception that courts are incompetent to review academic deci-
sions.211 Two Supreme Court cases set forth this general principle.
In both Board of Curators v. Horowitz2 12 and Regents of the University
of Michigan v. Ewing,2 1 3 medical students complained that their dis-
missal from a state university medical school on academic grounds vi-
olated due process.
In Horowitz, the plaintiff contended that procedural due process
required a pre-dismissal hearing.214 The plaintiff in Ewing argued
that the defendant's refusal to allow him to retake a standard medical
exam was arbitrary and hence violated substantive due process. 215
The Court refused to question the academic judgment in either case.
The Horowitz Court reasoned that the judicial or administrative style
fact finding that would occur in a pre-dismissal hearing had little util-
ity in verifying academic evaluations. Unlike disciplinary matters, for
example, which turn on factual inquiries into a student's behavior, ac-
206. Id.
207. Id. at 326.
208. See id. at 325 n.292 (citing People ex. rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 M11. 186,
187-88 (1866); Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882, 883 (Md. 1924)).
209. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. University of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). In Rosenber-
ger, the Court appears to treat a state university as a state agency which may be
entitled to rights as a "state speaker" under the appropriate circumstances. See
id. at 2516-20.
210. See Byrne, supra note 141, at 326 n.298 (citing Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d 88, 99
(6th Cir. 1980); Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, 626 F.2d 19, 21-22 (6th Cir. 1980);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961)). See
also Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978)(ed-
ucational process not adversarial).
211. Byrne, supra note 141, at 325-26.
212. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
213. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
214. See Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79, 82-84.
215. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1985). Plaintiff
argued that the refusal was arbitrary in that the medical school had allowed
other students to re-take the exam after initial failure. Id. at 219.
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ademic judgments depended on expert evaluation of cumulative infor-
mation that a hearing could not duplicate.216
Ewing applied the same reasoning to judicial review of academic
decisions. The Court flatly told the lower courts not to override a "gen-
uinely academic decision" unless it constituted "such a substantial de-
parture from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professionaljudgment."2 37 The Court was concerned, in large part, by the judici-
ary's lack of sufficient expertise to review such decisions.218
A prudential rule forbidding review of academic decisions that fall
within the norms of accepted practice will insulate a university from
liability in most cases. 219 To the extent that this rule applies in Sec-
tion 504 or A.D.A. litigation, the limitation of liability should be signif-
icant. Judgments made by academic authorities in determining
whether a student is otherwise qualified to enter or continue in a pro-
gram are rarely factual questions that can be easily verified by a
court. Rather, such decisions involve the application of professional
judgment to an array of facts and other information. It is precisely
these sorts of decisions that the Court in Ewing considered inappro-
priate for judicial review.
IV. APPROACHES TO DEFERENCE: HOW THE COURTS GO
ABOUT YIELDING TO ACADEMIC DECISIONS
UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE A.D.A.
A. Introduction
Part III of this paper examines the persistent rule of judicial re-
straint. The present section undertakes the task of identifying the
techniques employed by courts to effectuate the policy of abstaining
from review of academic decisions in Section 504 and A.D.A. cases. In
the absence of guidance from the United States Supreme Court in this
particular context, the lower courts developed a variety of approaches
designed to protect academic judgments. These decisions fall into
three categories. The first position is that academic decisions are
owed no deference at all. A second group of decisions is willing to sus-
tain any academic decision that is reasonable. The final position is
that academic judgments should be sustained so long as there is un-
disputed evidence that relevant academic officials have considered a
plaintiff's requests for accommodations and have made rational deci-
sions that a modification would affect academic integrity.
216. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978).
217. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
218. Id. at 226 (citing Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
89-90 (1978)).
219. Byrne, supra note 141, at 323.
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B. Methods of Deference
1. The No Deference Approach
Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado22O is the leading,
and perhaps only, case which pays no heed to academic judgments. In
Pushkin, the plaintiff was a medical doctor who suffered from multiple
sclerosis and was wheel-chair bound.221 After being denied admission
to a psychiatric residency program, he brought an action under Sec-
tion 504 seeking an injunction222 ordering his admission to the pro-
gram. Plaintiff was able to muster unusually good evidence that he
was otherwise qualified for the program and that defendants had ac-
ted solely on the basis of his disability. Defendants presented no cred-
ible evidence that they made any individualized determination that
plaintiff was unqualified for the residency; rather, the trial court
found that defendants rejected plaintiff's application out of a fear that
his disability would interfere with the treatment of psychiatric pa-
tients. 223 There were no specific physical requirements for the resi-
dency program;224  rather, residents needed the qualities of
"intelligence, emotional stability and physical stamina,"225 none of
which were at issue. Even under the restrictive pre-Alexander stan-
dards, plaintiff was able to convince the trial court that he met all
program requirements in spite of his disability. The court was critical
of defendants' unverified assumption that plaintiff was incapable of
making effective adjustments to patient reactions to his disability.226
On appeal, defendants argued that their decision about plaintiff's
suitability for a residency program should be sustained so long as it
was reasonable. They contended that a deferential, rational basis
test, like that employed under equal protection analysis, was neces-
sary to protect academic decisions concerning admissions to programs.
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the statute. The court was unable to reconcile a rule of defer-
ence to academic decisions with the plain language of Section 504
which forbids discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals
with disabilities.22 7 A rational basis standard of review would elimi-
nate the judicial role in academic cases under Section 504 and would
"reduce that statute to nothingness."228 In the Tenth Circuit's view,
220. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
221. Id. at 1376.
222. Plaintiff's claim for monetary damages was denied by the trial court. See
Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 504 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (D. Colo. 1981).
223. Id. at 1295-96.
224. Id. at 1298.
225. Id. at 1299.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1381-84.
228. Id. at 1384.
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the reasonableness of a defendant's action is relevant only to the issue
of whether those actions are discriminatory. 229
As a practical matter, the Pushkin philosophy of treating the rea-
sonableness of a defendant's actions simply as evidence of non-dis-
crimination makes it easier for plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment
and advance a claim to trial. Summary judgment is granted whenever
a moving party can demonstrate that there are no genuine factual is-
sues and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.230
In the typical Section 504 claim, the defendant institution brings the
motion for summary judgment; hence it bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of material factual issues.23 ' A defend-
ant's position is normally strengthened, however, by the fact that it
does not bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial.232 Therefore, the
defendant is only required to establish the absence of material issues
relating to any single element of a Section 504 claim.2 33
Usually that single issue in a Section 504 claim is plaintiff's failure
to meet an academic standard. Had the Pushkin court agreed to re-
spect academic decisions about student qualifications whenever there
was a reasonable basis for them, the defendant's burden in a summary
judgment motion would be minimal. As discussed at greater length
below,234 the reasonable basis standard merely requires that there be
some relationship between an academic standard and the pedagogical
goal. Normally, an affidavit from a relevant university official should
suffice to establish this fact. It will be difficult in most instances for a
plaintiff to offer evidence that an academic standard does not relate to
an educational goal. Instead, by treating the reasonableness of de-
fendants' actions or policies as evidence of non-discrimination and no
more, Pushkin enables plaintiffs to challenge academic standards by
offering competing evidence about their necessity. For example, a
plaintiff can present expert testimony that an admissions requirement
of a professional school has no relationship to job performance. Simi-
larly, a plaintiff can offer evidence that a standard is not used at other
schools. In either case, such evidence will likely create a material is-
sue about whether the waiver of an academic standard represents a
fundamental alteration in a program.
229. Id. at 1383.
230. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
231. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY Y. KANE & ARTHUR R. MLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 9.3 (2d ed. 1993).
232. Treatment of the burden of proof at trial in Section 504 cases falls beyond the
scope of this paper. For a discussion of the various approaches taken by the fed-
eral courts, see generally TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 3:13-17.
233. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 231, § 9.3.
234. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
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2. The Reasonable Basis Approach
A second, more widely accepted practice, is to defer to academic
authorities whenever they can demonstrate a reasonable basis for
their decisions. The underlying theme is the belief that courts are not
qualified to evaluate academic judgments or practices. Courts should
therefore abstain from questioning an institution's actions so long as
there is some basis for an academic standard or action and there is no
evidence of malice or discriminatory animus. Most decisions in this
category also take a generous view of what is reasonable. Only when
an academic standard or evaluation serves no apparent purpose will a
court question an institution's judgment. Doe v. New York Univer-
sity235 is the leading case.
The plaintiff in Doe was admitted to medical school at New York
University but had concealed a history of psychiatric disorders and
self-injurious behavior.236 She was forced to withdraw during her
first year when the school became aware of her condition.237 After
unsuccessful attempts to gain re-admission, plaintiff brought an ac-
tion under Section 504 seeking to be re-admitted to medical school.
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
and ordered her re-admission to medical school. It concluded that
plaintiff met her burden of showing probable success on the merits by
demonstrating that it was more likely than not that she could com-
plete medical school without a recurrence of dangerous psychiatric
symptoms. 2 3 s
235. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
236. Id. at 766. Plaintiff had specifically been diagnosed as suffering from Borderline
Personality Disorder by several psychiatrists. See id. at 768, 772, 777-78. Bor-
derline Personality Disorder is a serious condition that manifests itself in violent
and self-destructive behavior and is triggered by a stressful environment. Id. at
771-72, 778-79.
237. Id. at 767-68.
238. Under Second Circuit precedent, a preliminary injunction may be issued on a
showing of 1) irreparable harm, and 2) either a likelihood of success on the merits
or a sufficiently serious question going to the merits plus a balance of hardships
favoring the movant. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 773 (2d Cir. 1981).
The trial court found irreparable harm in the fact that plaintiff would have to
delay her medical education for a year. Id. at 773. The trial court also found
probability of success on the merits. The court reduced the merits issue to a ques-
tion of whether plaintiff could demonstrate that it was "more likely than not" that
plaintiff could complete her medical education without a recurrence of symptoms
that posed a risk to herself or others. Id. at 772. The court credited plaintiff's
evidence and concluded that defendant failed to offer sufficient proof that plaintiff
was not otherwise qualified and had not been rejected solely because of her disa-
bility. Id. at 772-73.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the trial court's ruling is its minimalist
view of the proper qualifications for a medical student. Attempting to apply the
Davis standard, the court concluded that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for
re-admission if she was more likely than not to complete medical school without a
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On appeal to the Second Circuit, a key issue was the trial court's
obligation to defer to the defendant's professional evaluation that the
plaintiff was not otherwise qualified to attend medical school. The
Second Circuit took the position that was rejected in Pushkin. It held
that although the ultimate decision on this point was a judicial func-
tion, courts must give considerable deference to institutional academic
judgments in the absence of proof that their academic standards or
applications served "no purpose other than to deny an education to
handicapped persons."23 9 The court was primarily concerned about
the incompetence of the judiciary, in contrast to experienced educa-
tors, to apply unfamiliar professional standards to students.240 The
appellate court could have reversed on the grounds that plaintiff had
not shown irreparable harm,2 4 1 but it decided to reach the merits of
the case. Applying the rule of deference, the court held that it was
improper for the trial court to disregard defendant's assessment of the
risk posed by the plaintiff.242 Given the magnitude of the harm, the
court felt that a medical school was entitled to make a judgment that
students should not present a significant safety risk even if the likeli-
hood of occurrence was less that 50%.243 The court further implied
that an "appreciable risk" would satisfy this standard. 244 Although
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, it was openly
recurrence of symptoms that would pose a danger to herself or others. Id. at 772.
Under this formulation, plaintiff would prevail even if the chances of a recurrence
were 49%. See id. at 777. It is unclear how the lower court reached this conclu-
sion. Even without granting deference to academic decisions, a court must begin
its analysis by determining whether plaintiff can meet existing standards in spite
of his or her disability or can meet them with a reasonable accommodation. The
court's rather lenient standard for re-admission to medical school ignores the de-
fendant's established criteria for re-admission: that a student demonstrate that
he or she has resolved all problems precipitating a leave, is now capable of sus-
taining all academic and emotional stress involved in attending medical school,
and can function properly as a physician. Id. at 768-69. Thus, the trial court's
approach in Doe appears to disregard the Davis holding that federal recipients
are not required to make substantial program modifications.
239. Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 775-76 (citing Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
92 (1978)).
241. Id. at 774.
242. Appellate review was complicated by the fact that the trial court chose to disre-
gard expert psychiatric evidence as well as the defendant's own judgments. In-
stead, the trial court considered the defendant's actual behavior over the previous
five years. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 772 (2d Cir. 1981). The
appellate court deemed this decision erroneous on the ground that the symptoms
of Borderline Personality Disorder could recur after a dormant period in an un-
stressful environment. Id. at 779. Reliance on expert opinion was therefore
necessary.
243. Id. at 777.
244. Id.
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skeptical that plaintiff could offer sufficient proof that she was other-
wise qualified given the rule of deference announced in the case.2 45
Several courts have adopted the Doe philosophy of deferring to rea-
sonable institutional decisions about who is qualified to participate in
a program.2 46 McGregor v. Louisiana State University Board of Su-
pervisors,247 for example, endorses the notion that courts should ac-
cept academic decisions barring evidence of malice or ill-will.2 48 Yet
the decisions in this category are not a tidy lot. There are some differ-
ences about what is reasonable and the degree of deference owed to
academic decisions.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Anderson v. University of Wiscon-
sin249 appears to be even more protective of academic discretion than
Doe. Plaintiff in Anderson was an alcoholic who had twice been dis-
missed from the University of Wisconsin Law School for failure to
maintain a minimum grade point average. He brought a Section 504
claim when the University refused to readmit him for the third time.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that his ability to succeed in law school
was a disputed, material issue that should be resolved at trial. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff's ability to succeed
was immaterial. The only issue was whether the law school had per-
formed a stereotype-free assessment of the plaintiff and applied to him
the same standards it applied to non-disabled students in determining
academic eligibility and re-admission. 50 The standards themselves,
the court stated, were a matter for the law school and not for the
court.25 1 The court's absolute statement, however, probably should
not be taken literally.
Since Alexander v. Choate, it is clear that recipients of federal
funds are required to make reasonable program modifications. The
Anderson court's rigid position is explained in part by plaintiff's sur-
245. Id. at 779.
246. See, e.g., Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988); McGregor v.
Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993); Doe v.
Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
247. 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
248. The McGregor court's use of the reasonable basis test is curious in light of previ-
ous Fifth Circuit decisions. The court cites Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248
(5th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that courts owe deference to academic deci-
sions. Brennan, however, questioned, in light ofAlexander v. Choate, the appro-
priateness of a previous decision, Doe v. Region 13 Mental-Health Mental
Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the circuit adopted
a broad rule of deference to program administrators. See Brennan v. Stewart, 834
F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988). Any doubts about the reasonableness standard
seem to have disappeared in the interim.
249. 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).
250. Id. at 741.
251. See id.
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prising failure to argue that Section 504 required defendant to alter
its program requirements or procedures. 252 A failure to implement a
reasonable accommodation should be actionable in spite of Anderson,
although an institution's good faith judgment about what is reason-
able would no doubt control.
Another variation occurs in Doherty v. Southern College of Optome-
try.253 Here, the Sixth Circuit appears to use "necessity" as the
threshold of academic deference instead of reasonableness. The plain-
tiff in Doherty suffered from retinitis pigmentosa and related neuro-
logical disorders resulting in a limited field of vision and diminished
motor skills.254 He was unable to pass a proficiency test in the use of
certain mechanical devices required for graduation from the defend-
ant optometry school.255 The court held that the defendant was free
to establish "necessary" academic requirements which need not be
waived under the Davis holding that federal recipients need not make
fundamental program alterations. 256 However, the court's analysis
and the evidence presented at trial focused on the reasonableness of
the mechanical proficiency requirement.2 57 In fact, plaintiff presented
persuasive arguments that the requirements were not strictly neces-
sary258 and might have prevailed had the court taken the term
literally.
Using reasonableness as the trigger for deference to academic
judgments should have the practical effect of insulating most aca-
demic defendants from liability. Nearly all Section 504 or A-D.A.
claims that seek program modifications involve a plaintiff who has
failed to meet general institutional standards of academic eligibility.
The threshold for deference to such decisions is remarkably low. In
Doe, for example, the Second Circuit called for deference to academic
evaluations unless there is proof that the institution's standards serve
no purpose other than to exclude a disabled person from an educa-
252. See id. at 740.
253. 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
254. Id. at 572.
255. Id. at 572-73.
256. Id. at 573-74.
257. Id. at 574 (expert opinion that proficiency requirements are "reasonable and
desirable").
258. Plaintiff offered proof that: 1) proficiency with the instruments was a recently
imposed requirement; 2) optometrists often do not use these four instruments in
their practice; 3) the instruments are not used in the defendant's general clinic;
and, 4) optometrists were prohibited from using these instruments in six states.
Given these facts, a professional judgment that an optometry student should be
proficient in the use of these instruments is probably reasonable but hardly nec-
essary in the sense that one cannot function as an optometrist without such
skills. Id.
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tional program. 259 It is a rare thing that an academic standard such
as a minimum grade point average or a course requirement does not
bear some relationship to the integrity of an educational program.
(Institutional defendants who cannot demonstrate such a link should
promptly secure new counsel.) Thus the issue is reduced to the simple
question of whether the plaintiff actually met the academic standards.
If not, he or she is not "otherwise qualified" to participate in the pro-
gram. A plaintiff's only remaining argument is that he or she was
treated differently than non-disabled students by the defendant.
Again, this strategy is not promising. Plaintiffs in the typical case ar-
gue that the failure to modify general academic standards is the
source of discrimination, i.e., that they should have been treated dif-
ferently. Except in the rare cases where there exists evidence of dis-
criminatory animus, plaintiffs are likely to fail.
Another consequence of the reasonableness rule is that many
claims will be terminated early through summary judgment. As noted
above, it is easy to demonstrate that an academic standard is reason-
able. It is correspondingly difficult to establish that a requirement
has no rational relationship to an educational objective. Educational
defendants should be able to establish the reasonableness of their
standards quite easily through affidavits or interrogatories. Plaintiffs
will be hard-pressed to create a triable issue under these circum-
stances. Rational basis is a minimal standard. At the same time, it is
insufficient to offer proof that alternative standards either exist or are
feasible. The reasonableness standard does not require that educa-
259. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981). The same approach is
followed in other circuits employing the reasonable basis test for deference. See
also McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.
1993); Wood v. President of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir.
1992)(citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 2d Cir. 1981). In McGre-
gor, the Fifth Circuit calls for "reasonable deference" to academic decisions, 3
F.3d at 859, (relying on Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1988)). The
Brennan court determined that program administrators' decisions should be re-
viewed under a standard of "meta-reasonableness;" that is, to validate reasonable
restrictions; and to give "reasonable deference" to the grantee's own determina-
tion of the restrictions reasonableness. Id. at 1261. In support, Brennan cites
Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th
Cir. 1983), which in turn cites to Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d at 776. Thus,
in spite of differences in terminology, the Fifth Circuit appears to adopt the mini-
mal Doe standard for academic deference. Notably, courts that have rejected the
reasonable basis standard have also pointed to the minimal requirement for def-
erence under the reasonable basis test. In Strathie v. Department of Transp.,
716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit equated the Doe approach
with the minimal rationale basis test used under 14th Amendment analysis. Id.
(citing Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958)(any conceivable basis justifies
constitutionality)); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)(legislative re-
form may proceed step by step). See also Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine,
932 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1991)(citing Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d
227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983)).
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tional institutions pursue optimal or even improved academic stan-
dards. They need only be reasonable.
3. Procedural Regularity
A third approach to academic deference is found in the First Cir-
cuit's decision in Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine.260 Af-
ter an unsuccessful first year of medical school, plaintiff received a
neuropsychological evaluation which concluded that he had difficulty
processing information in certain formats. He was re-admitted to the
first year class with several accommodations such as note-takers,
tutors, counseling, and tapes of lectures.261 Nevertheless, plaintiff
was dismissed from medical school after failing a multiple choice bio-
chemistry examination for the third time. After his dismissal, plain-
tiff secured additional diagnoses suggesting that he was dyslexic and
that he had difficulty interpreting certain types of multiple choice
questions. In his action against the school, the plaintiff argued that
Section 504 obliged the school to use a different test format. The
school's response was that the multiple choice format measured cer-
tain skills that a physician must have, including the "ability to assimi-
late, interpret and analyze complex written material... necessary for
the safe and responsible practice of modem medicine."2 62
Although the court eventually sided with the defendant,263 it
rejected the Doe approach of deferring to an academic defendant's de-
cisions whenever a reasonable basis can be found. While acknowledg-
ing a need to respect the professional judgments of educators, the
court was skeptical that a broad policy of deference based on a rational
basis test could effect Congress' goal of eradicating stereotypes and
generalizations that had denied the disabled access to federally
funded programs. 264 In the court's view, the Ewing approach of sus-
taining any standard or decision falling within accepted academic
norms failed to acknowledge an institution's affirmative obligation to
seek reasonable means of accommodating the disabled.265 The court
further noted that many possible accommodations are the result of
new technologies or techniques that are not yet within accepted aca-
demic norms.2 6 6 The First Circuit adopted the following test designed
to insure that the educational institution met its obligation to consider
all reasonable accommodations:
260. 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
261. Id. at 21.
262. Id. at 27.
263. See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992)(afflrming
summary judgment for defendant following remand).
264. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1991).
265. Id.
266. Id. (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979)).
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If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant
officials within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility,
cost and effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable
conclusion that the available alternatives would result either in lowering aca-
demic standards or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could
rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty of seeking reason-
able accommodation.2 6 7
In effect, the First Circuit took the reasonableness standard of Doe
and grafted on a requirement that the institution consider any sugges-
tions for accommodations in good faith and keep reliable records of the
decisional process. Although this standard for deference appears to be
more demanding than in Doe and its progeny, the Wynne decision is
probably more protective of academic autonomy. The court empha-
sizes that judgment as a matter of law, i.e., summary judgment,
should be the normal result when an institutional defendant presents
undisputed evidence that it considered proposed accommodations.26s
By characterizing an academic institution's duty as an obligation to
consider possible accommodations in good faith, as opposed to making
an accommodation, the First Circuit reduced the otherwise qualified
issue to a factual issue which is not likely to be disputed.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
Judicial treatment of academic standards in Section 504 and
A.D.A. claims suggests a two-part question. First, should the courts
yield to academic judgments about student qualifications? If we an-
swer yes to this question, then we must ask how to go about imple-
menting a policy of deference. I submit that deference is a good thing
and that the system of limited deference in the Wynne decision is the
wisest approach. There is room for disagreement. In this section I
propose to test my conclusion by weighing four factors that are likely
to influence any decision on this matter.
First, there is the institutional competence of the judiciary. Here
we ask whether there is any reason to think that courts are suited to
make judgments about the qualifications of disabled students. Sec-
ond, we must ask what effect judicial review would have on internal
academic processes. Third, there is the natural suspicion that ostensi-
bly academic decisions may be influenced by the costs of an accommo-
dation. Finally, we must ask whether a rule of deference encourages
institutional decision makers to act, even in good faith, on the basis of
subtle biases or stereotypes about the abilities of the disabled in ways
that Section 504 and the A.D.A. intended to eliminate. I do not believe
that judicial review will have a significant effect on internal academic
267. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
268. Id.
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procedure, nor do I think that universities flinch at the cost of chang-
ing standards. To my mind, the dispositive factor is judicial incompe-
tence in academic matters: the damage done by judicial intrusions will
outweigh any benefits gained.
B. The Question of Deference
1. Judicial Competence
a. Judicial Expertise in Academic Matters
As noted frequently throughout this paper, the typical Section 504
or A.D.A. higher education case involves an assertion by a plaintiff
that he or she is entitled to a waiver or modification of an academic
standard. The typical response is that the unmet standard is neces-
sary for program integrity and therefore cannot be relaxed. Whether
a program requirement is necessary or may be foregone is a determi-
nation that is not likely to lie within the expertise of most courts.
Standards are the product of professional judgment which in turn is
based on extensive education, training, and experience within an aca-
demic discipline, and, to some degree, interaction with other individu-
als or groups who have an interest in the academic program. 269 Even
outside of the higher education context, courts have already expressed
a general, if not overwhelming, preference for deferring to the deci-
sions of program administrators or other public officials when the lat-
ter possess a level of expertise that is relevant to the "otherwise
qualified" inquiry. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, for
example, a Section 504 case involving the dismissal of a public school
teacher susceptible to tuberculosis, the Supreme Court stated in dicta
that school authorities should defer to the reasonable medical judg-
ments of public health officials when assessing the risks of contagious
diseases.270 Lower courts have also acknowledged that program ad-
ministrators should receive at least some measure of judicial defer-
ence owing to their familiarity with the program in question.271
269. See infra notes 288-302 and accompanying text.
270. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
271. See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing
Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1981)); Doe v. Region 13
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
It is worth noting that decisions outside of the educational context have also
developed competing versions of deference to program administrators' decisions
about who is otherwise qualified to participate in a program. In Strathie, for ex-
ample, the Third Circuit imposed a rule that deference should occur once pro-
gram administrators offer a written record indicating that relevant officials
considered the proposed accommodations and rejected them as contrary to the
fundamental nature of the program. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231. This approach
was later adopted by the First Circuit in a higher education setting in Wynne.
See supra notes 260-267 and accompanying text. The defendant in Strathie re-
voked the plaintiff's bus drivers license upon discovering that plaintiff wore a
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Concerns for expertise and familiarity with particular programs
should apply equally to the highly specialized environment of higher
education. In some ways the need for judicial restraint may be
greater. One striking factual similarity among the academic defer-
ence cases is that plaintiffs are usually enrolled in professional pro-
grams, especially medical or health science programs. Plaintiffs in
Doe, Pushkin and Wynne were medical students or residents; Doherty
involved an optometry student; plaintiffs in McGregor and Anderson
were law students. I suspect, without any empirical basis, that the
prospect of career failure motivates disappointed professional stu-
dents to bring legal actions more than undergraduates in the same
situation. At any rate, the issues that arise under Section 504 and
A.D.A. claims in higher education will tend to involve highly technical
or specialized fields of knowledge. It will be difficult for courts to
make positive contributions to the resolution of such claims if aca-
demic deference is not observed.
In resolving the inevitable issue of whether the plaintiff was
"otherwise qualified," courts would, of course, be forced to entertain
the plaintiff's arguments that certain academic requirements or stan-
dards were not necessary to the integrity of an educational program.
Both plaintiff's and defendant's cases would inevitably focus on expert
opinions about educational practice. Given the want ofjudicial exper-
tise in these areas, courts would be especially reliant upon expert
opinions. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that courts have
the capacity to make meaningful determinations about standards in
such unfamiliar territory.
Doe v. New York University272 is illustrative of the pitfalls concom-
itant with forcing courts to review academic standards. As explained
at greater length in Part IV, plaintiff was diagnosed as having Border-
line Personality Disorder. One characteristic of this psychiatric disor-
der is a tendency to engage in violent behavior during periods of
stress. At issue was the defendant school's standard that medical stu-
dents must not pose a significant risk of endangering themselves or
others and the likelihood of a recurrence of plaintiff's symptoms. 2 73
hearing aid in violation of departmental safety regulations. In reversing the trial
court, the Third Circuit noted the defendantfs failure to make an individualized
determination as to the plaintiff's ability to operate a vehicle without imposing
safety risks and to consider proposed accommodations. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231.
In contrast, Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704
F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983) applies a reasonable basis test for deferring to a pro-
gram administrator's decision. In Region 13, the plaintiffwas dismissed from her
position as a psychiatric worker on the grounds of her own psychiatric disorders
which led to self-injurious behavior. Relying on Doe v. New York University, the
Fifth Circuit opted to give deference to decisions of program administrators out of
a reluctance to second-guess their expertise. Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1410.
272. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
273. Id. at 768-69.
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The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified"
to re-enroll in medical school so long as she was more likely than not
to progress through the program without a recurrence of dangerous
symptoms. 274 In other words, the court reduced the acceptable level
of risk to slightly less than a coin toss. The defendant's position was
that the potential for serious injury to patients and the plaintiff her-
self was unacceptable. 275
Although the Second Circuit reversed with instructions to give def-
erence to the defendant's standards,276 it is instructive to speculate
how the trial court might have gone about resolving the academic
standards issue in Doe were it free to do so. Since acceptable risk
levels are a matter of professional judgment, the court would have re-
quired expert medical testimony as to acceptable risk levels both in
medical school and medical practice contexts. In some instances, a
court can deal with such expert evidence in artificial ways. For exam-
ple, it might distinguish competing opinions on the basis of one ex-
pert's superior training or familiarity with risk factors in a particular
medical subspecialty. On the other hand, the court might be
presented with conflicting assessments from equally qualified experts.
(Indeed, disagreement among experts is likely inasmuch as risk as-
sessments are a method of dealing with uncertain events.) In these
difficult cases, I suspect, the court would be obliged to rule against the
party who carries the burden of proof, i.e., the plaintiff. Arguably, the
result would appear to be the same as simply deferring to academic
judgments.
Facts of other reported academic deference cases present the same
practical difficulties for courts as Doe. There is no doubt that the
plaintiff in Wynne277 could have found an expert to present evidence
that the ability to pass a biochemistry exam in a multiple choice for-
mat was not an essential skill for a practicing physician. Indeed, the
argument has some intuitive appeal: Hippocrates, Galen, and Joseph
Lister, to name a few, seem to have done well enough unscreened by
multiple choice tests. Similarly, the plaintiff in Doherty presented evi-
dence that his inability to manipulate certain mechanical devices bore
only a tenuous relationship to optometry practice. 278
Plaintiffs in McGregor279 and Anderson28O probably could have
found expert testimony that law school grades are not reliable indica-
tors of ability, do not correlate with successful law practice, or are so-
274. Id. at 772.
275. Id. at 771-72.
276. Id. at 779-80.
277. Wynne v. Tuft Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
278. Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988). See also
supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
279. McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
280. Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).
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cially undesirable. 281 The point is not that any of these arguments
are true; rather, the difficulty is that they may be impossible to refute.
Disagreement among experts in an educational speciality is unlikely
to be resolved by a judge, much less a jury. Indeed, in Anderson,
Judge Easterbrook seemed to be alarmed by the prospect of a jury de-
ciding to waive a law school's mTiniTnum grade point average.2S2
An obvious rejoinder to my pessimism about judicial competence in
educational matters is the fact that courts routinely handle compli-
cated matters. There is a bit of merit in this point. Judges and juries
are often called on to sift through mounds of complicated, technical
information in design defect, environmental, medical malpractice, and
defective construction cases. To acknowledge that courts undertake
such exercises, however, is not to say that they do it well. Courts re-
solve these disputes because no other institution is available to adjudi-
cate them. In contrast, the courts have been able to practice benign
neglect in educational matters since higher education has provided an
alternative mechanism for resolving academic questions. Rather than
proving the competence of courts to review educational decision mak-
ing, the courts' frequent experiences with complex litigation simply
illustrate the lack of an alternative forum.
A separate concern regarding judicial competence to review aca-
demic standards is the lack of an authoritative standard that the court
may apply to particular facts. Courts function well when a decision is
controlled by an ascertainable standard.283 To pick an easy example,
a statute of limitations requiring that an action be commenced within
six years has a sufficiently definite meaning to be applied easily by a
court. Similarly, a discovery rule that tolls the statute until a plaintiff
should have discovered an injury also provides a definite standard:
ambiguities will arise in the assessment of facts, not the law. Even
the reasonable person standard applied in tort law can be reduced to a
judicially manageable standard.2 84
A rule that a covered entity under the Rehabilitation Act or the
Americans with Disabilities Act need not compromise a fundamental
281. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Evaluating Students as Preparation for the Practice of
Law, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 313 (1995)(criticizes law school grading practices);
Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, Jane Balin, Ann Bartow & Deborah L. Stachel, Be-
coming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1995)(gender-based criticism of law school grading); Duncan Ken-
nedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchies, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
591, 600-01 (1982)(criticizing first-year law school evaluation practices).
282. Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737, 471 (7th Cir. 1988).
283. CouNcm ON THE RoLE OF THE CouRTs, Tim ROLE OF CouRTs N AixiERIcAN SocIEry
at 103 (1984).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947)(duty to prevent injuries is a function of three variables: probability of in-
jury, gravity of injury, and burden of precautions).
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standard is different. Here the question is not the standard itself, but
a particular post-secondary institution's judgment about program in-
tegrity. The unique circumstances of many academic programs and
the interaction with related interest groups28 5 makes it impossible to
reduce this analysis to a formula that can be applied by an out-
sider.286 The Supreme Court expressed a similar concern in
Horowitz. 2 87 The Court viewed the medical school faculty's evaluation
of plaintiff's clinical abilities as a subjective, cumulative process (pre-
sumably unique to each student) that cannot be duplicated in a judi-
cial style hearing.288 The Court's concerns regarding the review of an
institution's academic standards in Ewing28 9 are to the same effect.
b. Structural Incapacity of the Judiciary
Reasons for denying the courts a power to review academic stan-
dards go beyond the lack of judicial expertise in academic matters.
The very nature of academic standards makes them unsuitable for ju-
dicial review. These standards are often compromises that reflect the
interaction of many constituencies within the university community.
Sometimes these compromises are delicately balanced to accommo-
date competing institutional interests. A waiver of a standard may
upset a carefully crafted arrangement, resulting in repercussions in
other areas. External review of academic standards therefore may af-
fect more than the parties to a Section 504 or A.D.A. claim.
Lon Fuller described these situations as "polycentric."290 He ob-
served that the behavior of many social institutions turns on the com-
plex interaction of multiple, interrelated points of interest. He further
argued that attempts to alter any one element of a polycentric situa-
tion would have repercussions that may affect other centers of inter-
est. Fuller, in language too apt to leave unquoted, analogized
polycentric situations to a spider's web:
We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. A pull
on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout
the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not sim-
ply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather create a different com-
plicated pattern of tensions. This would certainly occur, for example, if the
doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a
"polycentric" situation because it is "many centered" - each crossing of
strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions.291
285. See infra notes 288-324 and accompanying text.
286. See CouNcI ON THE ROLE OF CouRTs, supra note 283, at 103-04.
287. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
288. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
289. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
290. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394
(1978)(citing MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOIN-
DERS 171 (1951)).
291. Id. at 395.
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Fuller argued that polycentric problems were suited to solution by
only two methods: managerial direction or contract.292 Managerial di-
rection, for example, allows the manager of a baseball team to resolve
the classic polycentric question of who will pinch hit for the pitcher
based on who is left in the bullpen (or the other team's bullpen), the
batting average of the pinch hitter in clutch situations, the E.R.A. of
the opposing pitcher against left-handed batters, how the other man-
ager is likely to shade the infield, and so forth.293 Such decisions are
complex, not subject to formulas, and require a high level of discretion
and intuition.294 Resolution of polycentric problems may also occur
through contract, for example, a process of reciprocal adjustment
among the centers of interest.2 95 Labor negotiations or multilateral
arbitration aimed at structuring various wage scales within a factory
are an example.29 6 Fuller noted that parliamentary methods were
comparable to contracts in that political deals struck after legislative
maneuvering could result in an accommodation of competing
interests.2 97
Courts, in Fuller's mind, do not have the capacity to resolve
polycentric problems.298 Polycentricity presents two principal impedi-
ments to adjudication by the courts. First, the difficulty in a polycen-
tric situation lies in the inability of a court to hear from all the parties
that will be affected by a judgment.299 The difficulty includes, but is
not limited to, the great number of parties likely to occupy a polycen-
tric position.30 0 Courts have disposed of actions involving vast num-
292. Id. at 398.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 399.
296. See id. at 395-96.
297. Id. at 400.
298. In Fuller's view, the essence of traditional adjudication was the "[p]resentation of
proofs and reasoned arguments." Id. at 363. Three conditions were necessary for
adjudication to function in an optimal fashion. First, the advocate must be free to
participate if the adversarial process was to reach an impartial judgment. Id. at
382-85. Second, the judge must be impartial but still knowledgeable about the
subject matter of the dispute. Id. at 385-91. Finally, decisions must be retrospec-
tive. Id. at 391-92.
299. Polycentricity can be further refined into concepts of legal and non-legal polycen-
tricity. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Reme-
dies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645-46 (1982). The former refers
to situations where the centers of interest in a polycentric problem have legally
protected interests. Id. at 645-46. For example, many persons may assert a legal
entitlement to the use of limited water resources. Id. at 646. Fuller apparently
did not draw this distinction. See id. at 646 n.36. Disability claims under Section
504 and the A-D-. fall into the category of non-legal polycentricity. The parties
with legally protected interests will be the disabled plaintiff and the post-secon-
dary institution. Other interested parties will tend not to have any legally as-
sertable claim. See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
300. Fuller, supra note 290, at 395, 397.
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bers of parties such as air crash litigation or class actions. In the
typical polycentric scenario, the parties to a legal action represent
only a fraction of persons who may be affected by a decision. Judicial
intervention, however, is limited to legally cognizable claims. The
courts simply have no basis for permitting the intervention of persons
who may be affected, yet lack a legally protected interest or relation-
ship with a party. Yet without their participation, no court can sensi-
bly evaluate the consequences of a ruling on a polycentric situation.30 '
Thus, a decision is like plucking a strand from a spider's web.
301. Id. at 394.
The role of courts in public law litigation is controversial and has produced an
academic debate that goes well beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to
note here that Fuller's pessimism about the courts' ability to deal with polycen-
tric situations is not universally accepted. Professor Chayes, for example, has
observed that public law litigation does not fit the traditional model of adjudica-
tion. The latter is characterized by a dispute in which the parties have diametri-
cally opposing interests, the wrong arises from a single episode, evaluation or
evidence is retrospective, and there is a close relationship between wrong and
remedy. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976). Public law litigation, in contrast, involves a
sprawling party structure; the adversarial relationship among the parties is often
affected by frequent negotiations; the remedy focuses less on redressing a wrong
than on adjusting future behavior; and, the trial judge takes on the role of a man-
ager of a complex remedial decree. Id. at 1284-1304. School desegregation, em-
ployment discrimination, and prison reform cases are good examples. Id. at 1284.
Chayes specifically recognized that public law litigation often affects the interest
of non-parties. Id. He argued that courts were capable of managing these types
of situations, largely through forcing the parties to negotiate workable remedies.
Id. at 1307-09. In effect, he is satisfied that judges can perform the managerial
functions that Fuller thought necessary to settle polycentric disputes. Judge
Frank Johnson adds a different viewpoint. He argues that judicial activism in
public law cases was made inevitable by the intransigence of public officials in
areas such as school desegregation, prison reform, mental health, and so forth.
See Frank M. Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TX
L. REv. 903 (1976). See also OwEN M. Fiss, THE Crvm RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
The situations that Chayes and Johnson envision are very different from
those presented by a Section 504 or A.D.A- claim requesting a program modifica-
tion. Judicial decisions in either area certainly have the potential to disrupt the
relationships of numerous unrepresented parties. In the former situations, insti-
tutions such as school systems, prisons, or mental health hospitals became dys-
functional or intransigent and were incapable of complying with the commands of
the law. On the other hand, there is no credible suggestion that academic offi-
cials in colleges and universities are systematically thwarting the rights of the
disabled. There is a difference between a college's curriculum review committee
and Bull Conner's dogs that requires no explanation.
Another difference is the scope of litigation and remedies. Desegregation or
prison crowding cases, for example, involve essentially one wrong directed at
many people. Hence one-size-fits-all remedies, such as redistricting or an order
to build new facilities, are possible. In disability claims about academic stan-
dards, the variety of disabilities and the uniqueness of their manifestations in
individuals dictate that litigation focus on the individual. Remedies will tend to
be personal to each litigant. (The same distinction may not apply, however, in a
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A second problem with judicial review in polycentric situations lies
in the nature of adjudication. Decision making in polycentric environ-
ments involves a back-and-forth interaction among the centers of in-
terest. Any proposal is subject to adjustment to accommodate the
responses of others. Decisions made under these conditions are likely
to reflect difficult compromises and trade-offs made by all concerned.
Professors Henderson and Twerski, for example, have observed this
dynamic in product design decisions3o2 while Fuller has noted a simi-
lar practice in labor negotiations.30 3 Traditional, adversarial adjudi-
cation in which each party stakes out a position at the beginning is
unlikely to yield a decision that approximates the result that would
occur after extensive interaction under polycentric conditions.
Academic standards are classic examples of polycentric interac-
tion. Unlike Athena, they do not leap full-blown from the head of
Zeus. Nor do they leap from the head of the department, the dean of
the college, or the provost. Instead, they tend to represent com-
promises based on the give-and-take among various academic constit-
uencies. Perhaps the most important constituency is the faculty itself.
Decisions on academic requirements tend to be assigned to faculty and
are the product of faculty deliberations. 304 Faculty, however, is not a
disability claim based on campus-wide building access and barrier removal).
Thus, the advantages of allowing judicial activism in public law litigation do not
apply to Section 504 or A.D.A. claims, at least to the same extent.
302. James A. Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 299 (1990).
Henderson and Twerski's description of the safety design process is illuminating.
In many design cases, plaintiffs confront difficulties in trying to intro-
duce a new alternative safety feature into an existing design. These dif-
ficulties arise because competing alternative design features inherently
tend to crowd each other out. Thus, introducing a new feature into an
existing design usually necessitates rearranging other aspects of the de-
sign and frequently requires rethinking much, if not all, of the existing
design. This feature ... reflects what the authors have elsewhere re-
ferred to as the "polycentric" quality of design problems. Simply stated,
a polycentric problem is one in which each of the elements is dependant
on all, or most, of the other elements, so that altering one element neces-
sarily alters all, or most, of the others.
Id.
303. Fuller, supra note 290, at 395-97.
304. See, e.g., A ExicAN BAR Ass'N, STANMARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAw ScHOOLs AND
INTEPRETATioNS, Standard 205 (1994)(dean and faculty have responsibility for
formulating curriculum). See also Bill Workman, Tougher Stanford Require-
ments: Students Must Have Higher Foreign Language Scores, S. FaAN. CImON.,
Jan. 27, 1995, at A14 (noting faculty control of curriculum); Thomas Sowell,
Power without Responsibility, FoRBEs, Feb. 14, 1994, at 85 (noting faculty control
of curriculum to the exclusion of university presidents); Lee Daniels, Education:
Liberal Arts Scholars Seek to Broaden Their Fields, N.Y. TniEs, Sept. 21, 1988, at
B8 (reference to curriculum reform by Duke and Stanford faculties); Eric N. Berg,
Harvard Will Require M.B.A Ethics Course, N.Y. TzIES, July 13, 1988, at D2
(faculty committee decision).
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monolithic concept. There are apt to be significant differences in edu-
cational outlook and philosophy within a single faculty. To the extent
that faculty members control academic standards, their actions will
reflect a compromise among the viewpoints of what constitutes mini-
mally acceptable performance or results in an academic program.
Other centers of interest undoubtedly influence the formulation of
academic standards, though in a less visible way. Accrediting agen-
cies, particularly in professional programs, may dictate or influence
academic programs. In consumer-oriented schools, students acting
through student organizations or through membership on university
committees may affect academic decisions. The demand for pass-fail
courses is a time-honored example. University administrators con-
cerned with institutional image may also be concerned about any per-
ception of lower standards. Concerns about the financial implications
of an academic standard, such as a required practicum, may also pi-
que the interest of a chancellor or president. Trustees and, in state
supported institutions, legislators may also want to influence aca-
demic decisions for a variety of reasons.
The polycentricity of academic standards has two significant impli-
cations for Section 504 and A.D.A. claims. First, comparison of aca-
demic standards among institutions, even in similar programs, has
little meaning in light of the many centers of interest that contribute
to rule formulation in each institution. In McGregor v. Louisiana
State University Board of Supervisors,3O5 the plaintiff sought a waiver
of a law school rule against part-time study as an accommodation for a
fatigue causing spinal injury. The gist of his argument was that other
part-time programs have been accredited by the American Bar Associ-
ation; hence L.S.U. should not be allowed to claim that a full-time at-
tendance standard was essential to a law school program.3 0 6 The
argument is superficially appealing. The American Bar Association
does not regard part-time programs as necessarily detrimental to legal
education. Moreover, a court does not need any special competence to
establish that alternative standards exist at other accredited schools.
Thus, various practices of related programs could be viewed as a range
of alternatives from which a court could select a reasonable accommo-
dation without jeopardizing program integrity.
The McGregor court dismissed the point by saying that the actions
of accrediting agencies do not have an "adjudicatory effect."307 The
305. 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
306. Id. at 859.
307. Id. Employing the reasonable basis standard, the court found that the full-time
program requirement was reasonable. In part, the court was persuaded by the
school's desire to create a first year experience that was comparable in intensity
with law practice. Id. at 859-60. Perhaps more importantly, the court acknowl-
edged that the school relied on a rigorous, full-time first year curriculum to win-
[Vol. 75:27
1996] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ACADEMIC STANDARDS 79
better reasoning, however, is that educational programs reflect their
own circumstances and are simply not totally comparable. All educa-
tional programs have some unique qualities or special emphases.
Some make deliberate choices to stand outside of the mainstream. Ac-
ademic standards employed in one institution may have little rele-
vance to compromises reached by academic constituencies elsewhere.
The availability of part-time law programs elsewhere had little to do
with the full-time attendance rule in McGregor, given the defendant's
admissions policies. The law school's admissions policy was based on
the unusual goal of admitting a large first year class with little regard
for qualifications which would then compete for a limited number of
seats in the second year class. 308 Practices of other schools were es-
sentially irrelevant under the facts of McGregor.
A second, and perhaps more significant, implication of polycentric-
ity in Section 504 and A.D.A. claims is that the courts cannot adjudi-
cate program modification requests without the risk of undermining
delicately balanced relationships within and without the academy.
Fuller's concern for the inability of courts to take into account the in-
terests of all affected parties is well illustrated in the academic defer-
ence cases. Take the example of the minimum law school grade point
requirements at issue in Anderson3O9 and McGregor.310 Grading
practices, including minimum grade averages, readmission standards,
and the like, reflect a faculty's judgment about minimally acceptable
performance. As previously noted, however, that judgment may em-
body a compromise of divergent philosophies within the faculty.
Inasmuch as the defendant in a Section 504 or A.D.A. claim is usu-
ally the institution, it is unlikely that the academic constituencies
that struck this particular balance can be heard in the resolution of
the claim. Nor are these the only centers of interest to be excluded.
Certainly the bar's obligation to protect the public from incompetent
lawyers gives it an interest in minimum standards for law school per-
formance.311 The need in Wisconsin, where Anderson arose, is all the
now down a large freshman class admitted under low admissions standards. Id.
at 859 n.12.
308. Id. at 854 n.3, 859 n.12.
309. Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).
310. McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff in McGregor had argued for advancement to the second year class in
spite of his grade point average as an additional or alternative accommodation to
a part-time schedule. Id. at 857-58.
311. The leading recent example of the bar's interest in legal education is the Mac-
Crate Report. See ANMBPcAN BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAw
SCHooLs AND THE PROFESSION: NARRowiNG THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PRO-
FESSIONAL DEVELOPAIENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CoNTnsuUa= (1992). The MacCrate
Report reflected the concern of the bar over the lack of practical training that law
school students receive. It identified a core of sldlls and values that all law grad-
uates should possess, id. at 135-221, and recommended that law schools review
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greater in view of the diploma privilege for University of Wisconsin
Law School graduates. 31 2 Employers of law school graduates, the
public,313 and legislators concerned with legal malpractice also have
an interest in an assurance that lawyers meet minimum standards.
Yet none of these interests is represented in a disability claim. A pol-
icy of academic deference leaves intact the relationship of these enti-
ties. To avoid belaboring the point, it is sufficient to note that similar
observations can be made about the cases dealing with the health care
professions, e.g., Doe,314 Doherty,S15 Wynne316 and Pushkin.317
It might be argued that polycentricity is not an impediment to
meaningful judicial review in those areas where a court is likely al-
ready to have sufficient knowledge about who is an "otherwise quali-
fied" student. The obvious example is a claim related to legal
education. While judges may not know much about biology,3 18 so the
argument goes, they are at least familiar with legal education, and
therefore, with the interests of faculty, the bar, and the public. They
their curricula for adequate instruction in these areas. Id. at 331 (recommenda-
tion C.8.). In response to the MacCrate Report, the A.B.A. House of Delegates
amended Standard 301(a) to read:
A law school shall maintain an educational program that is designed to
qualify its graduates for admission to the bar and to prepare them to
participate effectively in the legal profession.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAw ScHooLs, Stan-
dard 301(a)(1994)(emphasis added). Later the House of Delegates, over the objec-
tion of the Council of the Section of Legal Education and the American
Association of Law Schools, passed a resolution urging law schools to integrate
the MacCrate recommendations on skills and values into their curricula. See
John S. Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education; the Potential for Implementing
the MacCrate Report's Recommendations for Curricular Reform, 1 CLINICAL L.
REv. 363 (1994).
The MacCrate Report provoked considerable reaction from the law school
community. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes,
and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993)(dis-
cussing MacCrate Report in light of previous visions of the pedagogical state of
the legal profession); Richard A. Matsur, The MacCrate Report from the Dean's
Perspective, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 457 (1994); Tim MAcCRATE REPORT: BUILDING THE
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Joan S. Howland & Wil-
liam H. Lindberg eds., 1994). The American Bar Association's pivotal role in ac-
crediting law school programs puts it in an obvious polycentric relationship with
law school faculties, law school administrations, state supreme courts which gov-
ern admission to the bar, law students, and others. Imagine the repercussions of
a judicial decision that moot court is not a necessary element of legal education!
312. See WiS. Sup. CT. R. § 40.02(a), 40.03.
313. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Plus 9a Change, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1945, 1951 (1993)(A.B.A.
requirement of legal ethics course prompted by reaction to Watergate).
314. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
315. Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
316. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
317. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
318. Cf SAm CooxE, Wonderful World, on SAm CooE: THE MAN AND His Music (RCA
Records 1986)("don't know much biology").
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are also in a position to reach conclusions about how legal education
has prepared students for law practice. Indeed, the courts have shown
little inclination to defer to bar examiners in claims brought under the
federal disability statutes. 319
In D'Amico v. New York State Board of Bar Examiners,320 plaintiff
made an unsuccessful request to the New York State Board of Bar
Examiners to take the bar examination over four days instead of two.
The Board argued that the proposed accommodation would give plain-
tiff an unfair advantage and further argued that its decisions were
entitled to respect because of its expertise in testing.3 21 The court,
granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the accommodation,
noted that the accommodation was a medical, not a testing issue.3 22
Courts in Delaware323 and Massachusetts324 have also overruled deci-
sions of bar examiners.
In spite of judicial familiarity with law schools, there is no compel-
ling case for creating an exception to the general rule of deference.
First, the expertise of judges will tend to lie in the area of trial prac-
tice. Given that much of law practice takes place outside of litigation
in the form of transactional work, it is unlikely that the bench as a
whole will have the expertise to review academic standards designed
to produce "complete" lawyers. More importantly, it is doubtful that
judges have sufficient understanding of the dynamics within and
among law schools to overcome the repercussive effects of any judicial
decision.
Law schools are no more photocopies of themselves than schools in
other disciplines. Their standards reflect compromises among faculty
319. The value of a comparison of academic institutions with boards of bar examiners
is limited by the traditional independence of the former and the subordinate role
of the latter. Bar examiners tend to be the agents of state supreme courts to
whom the latter have delegated part of their authority and responsibility to gov-
ern admission to the bar. This agency relationship lacks the pronounced polycen-
tric features of a university or law school environment. Deference by courts to
bar examiners must therefore be based largely on the bar examiners' expertise in
testing the competence of law school graduates. See D'Amico v. New York State
Ed. of Bar Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 222.
322. Id. But see Christian v. New York State Rd. of Law Examiners, No. 94 Civ. 0949,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1876, (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(denying accommodation and dis-
agreeing with DAmico). Cf Pazer v. New York State Rd. of Law Examiners, 849
F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(denying accommodations for want of proof of
disability).
323. In re Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1994)(bar applicant with learning disabil-
ity ordered admitted after passing multistate and essay portions of exam during
different sittings).
324. Weintraub v. Board of Bar Examiners, No. OE-0087 (Mass. 1992) (bar applicant
with attention deficit disorder provided double the standard time to take
examination).
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philosophies of legal education and the influence of other interest
groups. For example, requirements for trial advocacy courses, partici-
pation in a clinical program, or substitutes for these experiences at a
particular school may reflect a compromise between traditional views
of legal education, less practice-oriented views, and the desire of ac-
crediting agencies to improve practice skills.
Judicial willingness to overrule bar examiners should also bear lit-
tle significance for academic matters. Bar examinations, at least in
theory, are designed to protect the public from incompetent lawyers by
testing for minimum competence within a limited range of legal sub-
jects.3 25 Law school programs, in contrast, may reflect a wide range of
philosophies and pedagogical goals with which the bench has no par-
ticular familiarity.326 In short, there is no reason to believe that a
325. See Code of Recommended Standards of Bar Examiners, in COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1994-95 vii-x (policy statement of Amer-
ican Bar Association, National Conference of Bar Examiners, and Association of
American Law Schools).
Purpose of Examination. The bar examination should test the ability of
an applicant to identify legal issues in a statement of facts, such as may
be encountered in the practice of law, to engage in a reasoned analysis of
the issues and to arrive at a logical solution by the application of funda-
mental legal principles, in a manner which demonstrates a thorough un-
derstanding of these principles. The examination should not be designed
primarily to test for information, memory or experience. Its purpose is
to protect the public, not to limit the number of lawyers admitted to
practice.
Id. at ix. The bar examination has been severely criticized on several grounds.
For a review of the literature, see generally W. Sherman Rogers, Title VII Pre-
emption of State Bar Examinations: Applicability of Title VII to State Occupa-
tional Licensing Tests, 32 How. L.J. 563, 584-91 (1989).
326. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM TnE
1850s To THE 1980s, at 264-79 (1983)(describing modem divergence between
legal profession and legal education and various philosophies of legal education).
As judged by trends in scholarship, the modem legal academy offers a pot-
pourri of legal philosophies. For example, there is traditional legal scholarship
with its emphasis on resolution of conflicts through identification of problems and
review of possible solutions. See Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct
Law Reviews, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1319, 1321-22. Closely related is doctrinal
scholarship which attempts to reconcile apparent inconsistences in appellate de-
cisions through the "skills of legal analysis." Richard A. Posner, The Present Sit-
uation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113 (1981). More modem
schools of thought include: 1) critical race theory, whose defining viewpoint is
that persons of color speak with a unique voice that dominant white males cannot
understand, see, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr. The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J.
2007 (1991); Richard Delgado, Legal Scholarship: Insiders, Outsiders, Editors, 63
U. COLO. L. REV. 717 (1992); 2) critical legal studies, which contends that law
lacks its purported qualities of objectivity and neutrality, see, e.g., John H. Schle-
gal, Notes toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Con-
ference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REv. 391 (1984); 3) feminist legal
theory, dedicated to exposing and eradicating the patriarchal elements of the
legal system see, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINISr THEORY OF
THE STATE (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives
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court has the capacity to second guess decisions about the essential
components of a legal education.
2. Internal Processes
Potential interference with internal academic processes also favors
judicial restraint in reviewing academic standards. First, there is a
legitimate fear that academic decision making will be influenced by a
desire to avoid the burdens of litigation. Even the resoluteness of
well-counseled defendants such as university officials and faculty may
waiver after months of discovery and days of trial. It is not farfetched
to assume that such persons will feel subtle pressures to avoid litiga-
tion by softening academic standards the next time a program modifi-
cation request is made. Coverage of Section 504 and A.D.A. claims in
the Chronicle of Higher Education and other media forums are likely
to have a similar effect on other academic officials who rule on pro-
gram modification requests.
Second, direct judicial review of academic decisions as to who is
"otherwise qualified" may have an undesirable effect on pedagogical
relationships. As noted in Part 111,327 a university's relationship with
its students is based upon values that do not prevail in the larger soci-
ety. Good educational results require that faculty and school officials
be given wide discretion in evaluating students. Permitting courts to
review academic standards or decisions about student qualifications
on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1547 (1993); 4) narrative or storytelling,
which emphasizes personal and often emotional descriptions of a particular con-
dition see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971
(1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreward: The Civil
Rights Chronicles, 99 HAnv. L. REv. 4 (1985); and 5) law and economics, which
believes that the law should promote maximization of economic value see, e.g.,
RicHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMnC ANALYsis OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1992). In spite of
the tenuous connection between the modem schools of thought and law practice,
see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 McH. L. REv. 34 (1992), such diversity of thought is
recognized by professional organizations as a good thing. See Report of the AALS
Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 477,
505 (1992) (perspective or methodology should play no role in evaluation of
scholarship).
In Robert Bolts's play A Man for All Seasons, Sir Thomas More remarks to his
son-in-law: "The law, Roper, the law. I know whatfs legal, not what's right. And
I'll stick to what's legal.... I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and
wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate, Im no voyager. But in
the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester." ROBERT BOLT, A Man for All
Seasons, in TMREE PLAys 147 (Heinemann ed. 1967). I doubt that even Thomas
More could make his way through the thickets of 20th Century legal philoso-
phies. In light of what happened to More, perhaps judges presiding over Section
504 and A.DA. claims should be reluctant to enter the thicket of academic
standards.
327. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
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would not only limit discretion, but would also introduce an inappro-
priate adversarial element into the student-teacher and student-insti-
tution relationship.
Although the fear of intrusion into academic processes is a legiti-
mate concern, we should be careful not to give undue weight to this
factor. While it is true that the prospect of litigation may affect deci-
sion making, it is probably impossible to measure the impact. Indeed,
such attempts to avoid a day in court are designed to go unnoticed.
Fear of litigation is also only one of many considerations in disposing
of program modification requests. The effect of intrusions into peda-
gogical relationships is also likely to be marginal. Higher education is
already subject to a web of civil rights laws that have introduced an
adversarial element into the university community. To the extent
that the old dynamic between student and university still exists, deny-
ing deference to "otherwise qualified" determinations of academic offi-
cials will not substantially alter campus culture.
3. Costs
It is possible that some institutions might take advantage of judi-
cial deference to avoid the costs of accommodating students with disa-
bilities. Although I have no empirical basis for this assertion, I am
confident that the cost of potential accommodations figures promi-
nently in the process of devising accommodations for students. In-
deed, both the Rehabilitation Act and the A.D.A. are sensitive to the
potential costs of accommodations and permit covered entities to take
expense into consideration under certain circumstances. Section 504
has been construed not to require accommodations that would impose
an undue financial or administrative burden on a recipient.3 28 The
same concern for costs also appears in the A.D.A. For example, regu-
lations issued under Title II of the A.D.A. permit covered entities to
decline to provide particular auxiliary aids and services 329 if doing so
would result in "undue financial and administrative burdens."330
Under Title III of the A.D.A., barrier removal in existing structures is
limited to "readily achievable"331 alterations which are defined as
those that can be undertaken "without much difficulty or expense."332
Covered entities under Title III may also decline to provide an accom-
modation if it imposes an undue financial burden.333
328. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979)(Section
504 does not require accommodations that impose undue financial or administra-
tive burdens.).
329. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2)(1995).
330. Id. § 35.164.
331. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)(1995).
332. Id. § 12181(9).
333. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)(1995)(undue burden defense for failure to offer auxiliary
aids and services).
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I doubt, however, that cost plays a significant role in proposals to
alter academic standards. 334 Unlike issues involving the provision of
auxiliary aids and services to remedy communications deficits (e.g.,
note takers, readers, and sign language interpreters), academic stan-
dards are inexpensive to waive or modify. Consider the facts of the
leading academic deference cases. The accommodation proposed in
Doherty335 would have required only a waiver of mechanical profi-
ciency tests; plaintiffs in Anderson3s6 and McGregor33 7 called for a
waiver of minimum grade point averages; Wynne38S involved a re-
quest for a biochemistry test in a different format; and Pushkin339 re-
quired a medical school to admit a doctor to a residency program.
None of these actions would have involved more than negligible costs.
Only Doe v. New York University34O appears to entail significant costs.
Had the plaintiff been ordered re-admitted to medical school, the de-
fendant might have felt it necessary to provide individual supervision
and add security during clinical education phases to guard against vi-
olent outbursts brought on by the plaintiff's Borderline Personality
Disorder. Yet, the financial burden defense was not raised. On bal-
ance, therefore, the cost factor seems neutral and does not work
against a policy of judicial deference.
4. Latent Bias
Finally, there is the matter of subtle, unintended discrimination
against disabled students. A system of judicial deference to academic
decisions may have a tendency to reinforce improper assumptions
about the abilities of the disabled or to perpetuate standards that un-
necessarily disadvantage them. In the absence of judicial review, or
the threat of review, academic authorities have no special incentive to
re-evaluate standards with an eye toward creating equal opportunity
for the disabled. Take the example of the Doherty341 case. The only
impediment between plaintiff and graduation from optometry school
was the ability to manipulate four devices that apparently were not
used frequently by practicing optometrists. Nothing in the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinion or that of the lower court indicates that school officials
ever considered the disabled when formulating the mechanical profi-
ciency requirement.
334. Professor Rothstein notes that larger post-secondary institutions may decline to
pursue arguments based on excessive cost out of a desire not to open their discre-
tionary budgets to scrutiny. ROTHsTmIN, supra note 10, § 7.10.
335. Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
336. Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1993).
337. McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
338. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
339. Pushkd v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1372).
340. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
341. Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Of all the arguments against judicial deference, the contention that
it may perpetuate unjustified assumptions about the necessity of cer-
tain academic standards has the most merit. The problem is not that
academic officials will act in bad faith when formulating standards;
rather, the danger is that they will not be moved to consider alterna-
tives that maintain program integrity but also promote equality of op-
portunity for the disabled. As a general matter, covered entities under
Section 504 and the A.D.A., including post-secondary institutions,
have an obligation that exceeds neutral treatment. Although the duty
does not amount to affirmative action, Alexander v. Choate342 made
clear that federal recipients have a duty under Section 504 to provide
"meaningful access" to disabled individuals.343
Titles II and III of the A.D.A. explicitly carry over the obligation of
covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations. 344 Legislative
history also makes clear that Congress did not intend to limit its ef-
forts to actions prompted by an active dislike for the disabled.
Although the record of the Rehabilitation Act is sparse, there are indi-
cations that its framers were also concerned with the neglect of the
disabled.345 In the A.D.A. Congress revealed a decided concern for
stereotyped or complacent views of disabled citizens. For example, in
detailing the need for legislative actions, the report of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources noted:
Discrimination results from actions or inactions that discriminate by effect as
well as by intent or design. Discrimination also includes harms resulting from
the construction of transportation, architectural barriers and the adoption or
application of standards and communication and criteria and practices and
procedures based on thoughtlessness or indifference - of benign neglect.
3 46
When courts defer to academic judgments about program standards,
they may create a de facto exception to the general requirement that
covered entities take steps to promote equal opportunity for the dis-
abled by making reasonable accommodations in program
requirements.
5. Conclusion
Resolving the question of whether courts should practice deference
to academic decisions depends largely on the first and last of the four
342. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
343. Id. at 301.
344. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
345. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (citing 117 Cong. Rec. 45974
(1971)(statement of Rep. Vanik)(treatment of the disabled is one of "shameful
oversights" causing them to be "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored"); id. at 296-
97 (architectural barriers result despite lack of discriminatory intent).
346. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 29 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 25 (1989).
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factors discussed above. As already noted, we can discount the effect
of interference in internal university processes as minimal or incre-
mental at worst. It is also unlikely that costs have much to do with
decisions about waiver or modification of academic standards. The is-
sue then becomes how to balance the incompetence of the courts in
academic matters against the possibility that university officials will
be lulled into complacency about the effects of academic standards on
the disabled.
I would strike the balance in favor of academic deference. The un-
desirable effects of requiring courts to review academic standards will
occur anytime a plaintiff raises the issue with sufficient evidence to
survive preliminary motions. Gauging the effect of the final factor is
more difficult. We should not assume that academic officials will use
judicial deference as a shield for bad faith attempts to avoid the disa-
bility laws; it is also not possible to measure the degree to which defer-
ence has discouraged introspection about the necessity of academic
standards.
The benefits of permitting judicial review are equally speculative.
The mere possibility of having to defend standards in court must have
some effect on academic behavior. However, I would not expect that
effect to be significant until university officials are confronted with the
possibility of adverse decisions. Indeed, some decisions might have
turned out differently had the courts been free to adjudicate academic
standards. Doherty34 7 is the obvious example. A trial court freed of
the obligation to defer might conclude that the ability to operate the
four mechanical devices in question was unnecessary to optometry
practice. Such a decision, in turn, might have prompted other optome-
try schools to review their catalogs for marginal graduation require-
ments. Perhaps an adverse decision in McGregor348 would have
prodded the defendant and other law schools to reconsider hard and
fast rules against part-time study. A decision in Wynne349 favoring
plaintiff might have prompted medical schools to review their testing
policies.
In many cases, however, the effect of judicial review would proba-
bly be marginal. It is difficult to imagine that the defendant in Doe v.
New York University350 would have compromised its standards on pa-
tient safety even if the plaintiff won re-admission to medical school or
that other medical schools would have followed suit. Similarly, I
doubt that adverse decisions in AndersonSSl or McGregor352 would
347. Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
348. McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
349. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
350. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
351. Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).
352. McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
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have prompted those law schools to alter minimum grade require-
ments. Even judicial incompetence plays a role here. A side effect of
incompetence is inconsistency. It is reasonable to assume that the
courts will produce inconsistent results if forced to review standards
that they do not understand. University officials would have a diffi-
cult time reacting to such decisions in a meaningful way. In short, the
benefits of permitting judicial review are hazy at best. Trading away
a system that respects academic judgments for one that encourages
academic introspection to an unpredictable degree is a bad bargain.
C. Methods of Deference
Given the need to respect academic decisions, there remains the
question of how best to affect this practice. As discussed in Part IV of
this paper, two approaches have emerged in the reported decisions.
Significantly, neither method extends carte blanche to university offi-
cials. One group of cases, exemplified by Doe v. New York Univer-
sity,353 extends deference any time a school can articulate a
reasonable basis for its actions. This approach contemplates that
most actions involving academic standards will terminate on motions
for summary judgment.354 So long as a pertinent university official
can produce an affidavit indicating in good faith that an academic
standard has some pedagogical value, then the institution should pre-
vail on its motion for summary judgment; plaintiff's day in court will
be done.
A second approach, exemplified by Wynne, 35 5 focuses on internal
processes. Deference is triggered by proof that the relevant university
officials considered proposed program modifications in good faith, re-
jected them, and documented these steps.3 5 6 This approach also con-
templates early termination of litigation by summary judgment.
On balance, the Wynne approach is the better policy. The two
methods are equally effective in protecting academic decisions from
judicial incompetence. Academic defendants subject to the "reason-
able basis" test of Doe v. New York and related cases should find little
difficulty in articulating some pedagogical basis for an academic stan-
dard.357 Similarly, defendants bound by the Wynne approach simply
must adjust their internal processes to ensure that all program re-
quests by disabled students are handled under a uniform procedure by
attentive officials who keep good written records of decisions. The dif-
ference between the two standards lies in their power to force univer-
353. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
354. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
355. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
356. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
357. Id.
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sity officials to consider the effect of academic standards on the
disabled.
Schools bound by the "reasonable basis" approach have little incen-
tive to re-examine academic standards in light of the needs of the dis-
abled. They enjoy a favorable standard of judicial review that will
confirm nearly all academic standards once the unchallenging task of
showing a reasonable basis has been performed. Serious re-examina-
tion of program requirements may only take place after litigation be-
gins. At this stage, however, the review may be affected by the now
openly adversarial relationship between school and student. Conse-
quently, the review will hardly reflect genuine academic judgment.
In contrast, the Wynne approach encourages review of academic
standards when a program modification request is made. There are
three advantages to forcing a decision at this point. First, early re-
view takes place before litigation commences and when the prospect of
legal action is often distant.358 Decisions made away from the specter
of litigation are more likely to be based on academic considerations
than on limitation of liability. Second, the documentation require-
ment of Wynne guarantees that each request will at least be consid-
ered by someone with decision making authority and get a reasoned
response. Third, Wynne may encourage institutions to permit dis-
abled students or their advocates to participate in the accommodation
review process. While Wynne does not accord any particular proce-
dural rights, its protective standard of review plus its emphasis on
procedural regularity may encourage universities to seek out the po-
tentially valuable input of students at the decisional stage.
The Wynne approach does not guarantee that post-secondary insti-
tutions will review academic standards with sensitivity to the capabil-
ities of the disabled or with enthusiasm for integrating them into
American society. Accomplishment of this goal would require a far
ranging power to review standards which the courts are not capable of
doing. Wynne does, however, advance the goal of integration as far as
judicial competence permits. Courts perform well when called upon to
police compliance with procedures. The issues that a court must en-
tertain under Wynne are largely factual and do not require entry into
the unmanageable complexities of polycentric educational structures.
The courts can force academic officials to go through the motions of
accepting requests for program modifications and giving them due
358. There is universal awareness by academic officials that the denial of a program
modification request may lead to litigation. As noted above, however, the effect of
this knowledge plays an unmeasurable and probably marginal role in most aca-
demic decisions made under Section 504 and the A.D.A. In some instances, early
participation of counsel for either students or post-secondary institutions may
create a charged atmosphere that destroys the chance that decisions will be made
on purely academic grounds.
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consideration. These officials need only act in good faith. If so, the
stereotyping of the disabled which the Supreme Court condemned in
Davis will be subordinated to factual inquiries and decisions based on
the application of relevant institutional standards. Wynne is not an
ideal standard. It is, however, the best solution to a difficult problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial deference to academic decisions is a concession to the fact
that courts are normally incapable of making meaningful assessments
of academic decisions. A policy of deference nevertheless limits the
power of courts to advance the goal of Section 504 and the A.D.A. to
create equal opportunity for the disabled. It also creates an environ-
ment in which university officials are less likely to pursue this goal
vigorously. I have attempted to demonstrate that judicial incompe-
tence should be the controlling factor in this inquiry. Courts are un-
likely to offer satisfactory answers to the question of who is "otherwise
qualified" to enter or continue in educational programs. Undoubtedly
some benefits would flow from allowing plaintiffs to challenge aca-
demic standards at trial. Academic officials would become more sensi-
tive to the goal of creating equal opportunity for the disabled. To some
degree, they would become more disposed to review the appropriate-
ness of standards for disabled persons in general and would become
more receptive to individual program modification requests. But the
benefit is too speculative to overcome the injury that would occur by
allowing courts to weigh academic standards. A rule of law that for-
bids discrimination against the disabled only when they meet aca-
demic standards cannot escape the need to rely on academic expertise
in resolving the central factual issue.
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